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ABSTRACT
Grassroots leaders act as a bridge between poor communities and the services they
deserve. Electoral mobilization provides an opportunity for neighborhoods to get
access to resources from outside the community that they can use for develop-
ment projects, community events, and assistance accessing state services. Yet,
communities employ very different tactics to achieve their development goals and
some communities are better able to leverage their vote record for resources than
others. My dissertation explores grassroots neighborhood politics in three parts
using data from Juntas de Acćıon Comunal (CAB) records, surveys, and original
interviews in Colombia. The dissertation fills important gaps in the literature on
clientelism, local politics, and community development by providing a theoreti-
cal framework to understand community leader motivations and applications to
the Colombian context. The typology in Chapter 2 highlights institutional di-
versity in community brokers that can help explain contradictory findings in the
clientelism literature, backed by in-depth interviews and survey results with so-
cial leaders from the mountains and lowlands in Colombia’s Caribbean coast. In
the third chapter, I utilize surveys and interviews with CAB presidents in Santa
Marta, Colombia to demonstrate the connection between social leader elections
xii
and leader choices when acting as political brokers. While democratic elections
for community leaders may have other normative benefits, they often push leaders
to acquire funding for projects through mobilizing voters in support of candidates
for public office, even at the expense of undesirable candidate characteristics like
corruption records. The final chapter explores how community leaders signal the
strength of their vote bloc at polling places using spatial maps of CAB neighbor-
hood headquarters and results from the 2018 Senate race in Bogotá, Colombia. I
introduce a new way of thinking about broker monitorability at the polling station
level and find that polling places with more dense brokerage networks are more
competitive and are more likely to see votes for down-ballot candidates that lack
name recognition, suggesting that CAB leaders are actively mobilizing voters in




In Colombia, neighborhood governance collectives called Juntas de Acción Comu-
nal (Communal Action Boards or CABs in English) provide a formal link between
communities and municipal governments and an informal link between voters and
candidates for public office. Elected CAB leaders increase state legibility (Scott,
1998) by collecting demographic data and community concerns and presenting
them in a systematic legible format to the municipal government. They also often
perform brokerage work for political parties and candidates due to their promi-
nence in neighborhood civil society. Leaders acting as intermediaries translate
deep contextual knowledge to scale for both the state and politicians, but balance
both these tasks with their own desire to maintain community goodwill and be
re-elected themselves.
In my dissertation I address the complex nature of these grassroots actors by first
providing a holistic overview of their roles and responsibilities in the communities
where they work and the wealth of diversity in the forms these institutions take
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as a response to their environment. I then delve into how mechanisms of account-
ability can constrain leader-as-broker behavior to promote public goods provision
during elections, but may in turn perversely affect the type of political candi-
dates that end up in legislative positions. I follow this with an in-depth look at
the density of grassroots leaders and their impact on polling place voter outcomes
in Senate elections in Bogotá. The dissertation closes with avenues for future work.
I employ a thoroughly mixed-methods approach to understanding these important
local institutions. My dissertation’s central arguments came out of inductive ex-
ploratory field work beginning with a year-long stay in Colombia where I focused
on listening and shifting my research in response to local conditions. Neighbor-
hoods as a unit of analysis present challenges to traditional quantitative inference
because we tend to lack standardized data at this granular of a level. In response,
I collected my own dataset of interviews with 192 communal action board lead-
ers, a discrete-choice experiment that succinctly measures how local leaders choose
who to endorse as a candidate for public office and spatial mappings of communal
action boards across Colombia’s capital city.
Each chapter of the dissertation contributes to a growing and dynamic literature
on how people connect with politicians through brokers - a catch-all term for in-
dividuals who link candidates for public office with the supporters they need for
election. Chapter one provides a framework on the types of constraints different
2
brokers face that helps interpret conflicting findings in the clientelism literature.
Chapter two complicates previous findings that accountabilty for brokers promotes
local development by showing how social leader elections perpetuate brokerage re-
lationships at the expense of clean political candidates. Chapter three contributes
to work exploring the density of brokers and challenges existing conceptualizations
of how politicians monitor broker performance.
Who are Communal Action Board Leaders and What do
they Do?
Juntas de Acción Comunal (CABs or Juntas) were created in Colombia during
the 1950s with the specific purpose of augmenting the reach of the state in the
aftermath of La Violencia - a violent civil war. Internal displacement during
La Violencia accelerated the pace of urbanization in Colombia, and the national
government sub-contracted local social leaders to disseminate and collect informa-
tion in the newly settled areas.1 Up to 30% of the country’s local infrastructure
projects were requested and directed by communal action boards and the country
has around 45,000 officially registered boards active today (Ministerio del Inte-
rior, 2019). In the past three years alone, however, 462 social leaders have been
assassinated, which has decreased the activism of junta leaders in their communi-
ties and greatly disrupted their ability to connect often poor residents to necessary
state services. Particularly in rural areas that were previously controlled by armed
groups, communal leaders have a stigma of association with guerrilla or paramil-
1This process often involved encroaching upon indigenous territory. Today indigenous groups
in Colombia have unique indigenous leadership structures rather than communal action boards.
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itary forces and development actors in some sectors eschewed working with CAB
leaders due to rumors of corruption and local community mistrust (Schwab, 2017).
Juntas de Acción Comunal in Colombia range from near total substitutes for the
state in remote areas of the country to little more than “Juntas de Papeles”.2
Their official functions and responsibilities include expansive governance roles like
identifying and addressing community needs, spreading information about public
initiatives, helping community members access state services, serving as conflict
resolution mechanisms, organizing labor for community development initiatives,
and even denouncing human rights abuses to state authorities (Vargas, 2019). In
practice, communal action board leaders in my field site, Santa Marta, spend much
of their time solving problems for local residents, hosting block parties, and gen-
erating donations and labor to fix collective neighborhood issues like potholes and
drainage pipes.
In most municipalities, the city government allocates a certain amount of money
each year to fund communal action board activities and fund development projects
through block grants. The national Ministry of the Interior also provides some
grants and loans. CABs tend to be the most active in lower-income and informal
neighborhoods where the need for self-governance and government intervention is
the most acute.
2Interview with Municipal Affairs Office Staff in Santa Marta, October 2019
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Local leaders substitute for weak state capacity through collecting and disseminat-
ing information at the grassroots level (Auerbach, 2016; Read, 2012). For example,
elected neighborhood association presidents in Colombia help residents navigate
bureaucracy and learn about public benefits. They also serve as a contact point
for bureaucrats on matters of community development, and advocate for their
neighborhood by providing up-to-date information to municipal decision-makers
with less detailed knowledge. Particularly in areas where the state is distant, local
leaders serve as reputable grassroots links. Without this link, the state would lack
both critical information on community needs and a method of communicating
with residents.
Local leaders also act as brokers by connecting politicians to voters. Politicians
contract with brokers because they lack direct linkages, credibility and knowledge.
Brokers in return provide a variety of services including mobilization, facilitat-
ing access, and responding to voter demands (Zarazaga, 2014; Nichter and Per-
ess, 2017; Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Szwarcberg, 2015; Auyero, 2000). In
Colombia, neighborhood leaders negotiate arrangements with politicians based on
the number of voters they can bring to the polls and the incentives politicians
are willing to offer in return. Through their brokerage work, local leaders connect
weak political parties to voters.
5
The behavior of local leaders who multitask as grassroots governors and political
brokers can appear conflicting when researchers look at these tasks in isolation. In
the following section I present a descriptive and holistic look at the main institu-
tional actors in my dissertation and provide a clearer picture of the motivators of
their behavior. When possible, I show the responsibilities facing these grassroots
actors in the words of communal action board presidents themselves.
Local Leaders Increase State Legibility
In many areas of low state capacity, governments formally or informally subcon-
tract out the role of the state in collecting and disseminating information to inter-
mediary neighborhood-level leaders. Grassroots organizations led by these lead-
ers are common in democracies where they take the form of Katchi Basti Vikas
Samitiyaan in India, Sanguniang Barangays in the Philippines, Rukun Wargas
in Indonesia, Citizens Advisory Councils in Iraq, Shuras in rural Afghanistan, or
Juntas de Acción Comunal in Colombia. When these types of community councils
work well, they can play a pivotal role in communicating community concerns to
higher levels of government, creating buy-in and spreading trusted information
about public benefit programs among populations skeptical of the formal state,
and gathering and transmitting demographic information that can be used in de-
velopment efforts. Local leaders filter complex grassroots knowledge for the state
and interpret the state for neighborhood residents. Because of these abilities, local
neighborhood associations are a cost effective way to increase state legibility in
6
low state capacity areas.
States have a desire to create a legible social order by codifying and systematizing,
even when these standardization schemes stand in contrast to local practice (Scott,
1998). Low state capacity is a product of low legibility - when states have little
information about citizens and their activities, they are unable to enforce rules
and overcome collective action problems like free-riding (Lee and Zhang, 2017).
Specifically, Lee and Zhang (2017) find that sub-national areas with less errors in
census data, their proxy for state legibility, have better tax collection capacity and
provide greater public goods. Consequently, collecting accurate demographic data
in areas where it is absent is usually a high-level state priority.
Communal action board leaders extend the state by collecting these kinds of demo-
graphic data and even physically link citizens by bringing residents to municipal
offices. In doing so, they play a central role in translating the state and political
society to diverse local contexts. One leader I spoke with described themselves as
the “eyes, and ears in the community” and “agents of information” identifying the
most pressing needs for local officials, but also acting as “spokespersons for the
benefits that the mayor’s office, the government, or the Ministry of the Interior
are giving.”3 They respond to formal requests for information through surveys
and consultations for the city’s development plans, but also act as informal inter-
3Interview 7269 - Spring 2020
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locutors by connecting residents in need to friends in city government and calling
government bureaucrats personally.
The information balance between the state and social leaders is asymmetric. As
one leader noted, “we really know who is who in this community, we know who
deserves attention, and we know who is faking it to achieve a goal. We know,
while the administration does not.”4 Particularly in areas where housing is infor-
mal and people lack land titles, communal action board leaders play a key role in
vouching for claimants in land disputes or in deciding eligibility for place-based
social welfare programs. One leader called himself, “the overseer of social welfare.”5
Local leaders in Colombia are active members of civil society and not just block-
level bureaucrats. They can and do utilize protests to pressure local authorities or
private corporations to address community grievances. As one leader described it,
they “remind authorities that communities sometimes react through civil disobe-
dience” and straddle the line between instigating protest movements and calming
them.6 They also sometimes completely substitute for the state when the state
is not working for them. Multiple leaders described building their own vigilante
force as their response to security challenges and mistrust of the police.
4Interview 7064 - Spring 2020
5Interview 5851
6Interview 7269 - Spring 2020
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I asked CAB presidents in Colombia to describe what people in their neighbor-
hood usually ask them for help with. Responses to this question demonstrate the
expansive roles of social leaders in local communities, both in connecting people to
state services, making claims, and providing self-governance through community
resources. The table below displays the type of help they mentioned.
Table 1.1: What do Social Leaders Do?
• Elderly benefits
• Property Legalization
• Contesting welfare strata ratings
• Electric grid repairs
• Donations for neighbors in need
• Signing up for welfare services
• Proving neighborhood residency
• Crime and Security
• Access to water
• COVID-19 food distribution
• Flattening dirt roads
• Paving roads
• Raising funds for public projects
• Christmas Parties
• Neighborhood clean ups
• Building a soccer field













• Security camera installation
• School improvement
• Drainage and Sewage
• Conflict Victim Status
• Land Disputes
Not all grassroots leaders exert the same level of effort in substituting for the state
and immense variation exists in the extent to which leaders focus their energy on
the more financially lucrative political work. The overlap between these two tasks
results in biases in terms of the distribution of aid and assistance to people who
9
need it.
Clientelism and Local Leaders
Leaders of local organizations are often co-opted into clientelist brokerage positions
where they leverage their community knowledge and influence to gather votes for
political parties in exchange for positions of greater prestige or stability in the
municipal government, rents from local development projects, or simply better
public services for their communities (Novaes, 2018; Holland and Palmer-Rubin,
2015; Baldwin, 2013; Koter, 2013). The potential to bring many voters to the polls
makes politicians more interested in forming relationships with local leaders that
have larger followings, giving bigger groups better rewards (Szwarcberg, 2012).
Clientelism is relatively commonplace in Colombia (Fergusson et al., 2017) and
tiered networks that include co-opting social leaders as brokers are the dominant
way of buying votes (Palencia, 2013; Jimeno, 2018). For example, in observations
of a communal action board meeting, the area president implored residents to re-
register at a new polling place located in their neighborhood and attend rallies
in support of the incumbent mayor in order to receive a new community water
tank through a municipal small works grant. CAB presidents working as political
brokers sell neighborhood votes wholesale to candidates during election season in
exchange for public incentives to be shared with the community and/or private
incentives that the broker can pocket. Of the vote-buying expenditure, one source
10
suggests that brokers can take a 20-30% cut (Caro, 2019).
Coordinating turnout is a massive component of CAB leaders’ election-period ac-
tivities. Politicians outsource the work of bringing people to the polls to communal
presidents by allocating methods of transportation to brokers, often in the forms
of vans and motorcycle taxis. Motorcycles tend to work better than vans, which
means that the neighborhood presidents engage in a serious logistic enterprise bal-
ancing one-by-one transport with impatient voters. Politicians have to rely on
neighborhood presidents, acting as brokers, to coordinate these turnout efforts be-
cause the logistics require detailed, on-the-ground, community knowledge and an
intuition about how residents plan to vote such that more certain supporters get
transportation preference. Traffic is usually heavy on election day, particularly
near polling places, and many people live too far away to reasonably walk, so
without this transportation, many neighborhood residents likely would not turn
out to vote.
Communal action board presidents in Colombia are sometimes dealt a bad hand
for turning out voters. Heavy rain from the hurricane season that coincides with
elections every October can wash out roads, making certain neighborhoods im-
passable. Some neighborhoods are dominated by immigrants from Venezuela who
entered the country on provisional visas or are undocumented, meaning they can-
11
not vote in even territorial elections unlike other permanent resident non-citizens.7
Colombia has one of the highest rates of internal displacement in the world, and
many residents in their neighborhood could prefer to vote in the municipality
from which they migrated. Luis, a communal action board president, coordinates
motorcycle transportation for the many residents of his neighborhood who had
been displaced from their homes in rural areas of the municipality but refuse to
change their voter registration, which means many of his motorcycles are used
sending people to vote over an hour away. While brokers in the literature seem to
be able to choose where they work and who they can mobilize, the “community
leader” brokers that are common in many parts of the world are geographically
constrained and have to deal with unhelpful geographic conditions if they want
access to politically-motivated redistribution.
I spoke with communal action board presidents about whether they engage in
voter mobilization and responses were divided between those who do not engage
in voter mobilization at all, those who do mobilize voters but described themselves
as guiding and suggesting candidates in implicit terms, and others who made their
political efforts explicit. Some leaders interviewed denied participating in any
form of voter mobilization, and were clear in their commitment to not use their
leadership positions to engage in electoral politics. Some referenced democratic
7I conducted resident interviews in a few peripheral neighborhoods in Santa Marta where my
research assistant and I spent three to four hours looking for Colombian citizens only to be told
that these neighborhoods were “puro Venezolano” which did not square with board membership
rosters claiming that the area had hundreds of Colombian residents.
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principles in explaining why they stayed away from politics, claiming that “peo-
ple should make voting decisions on their own”8 and that “politicians, when they
get elected, have to give things to the neighborhood or the pueblo, irregardless of
whether one is giving them votes there.”9 Others felt strong animosity towards
politics. One leader went so far as to call himself “a-political” because he was
“against the bad government that Santa Marta has”10 and another summarized
his reasoning as “communal means communal”11
Other respondents framed their work in purely electoral terms that fit neatly into
the definition of brokerage, and were proud of their political engagement. One
leader told our team that he has “854 votes” and he mobilizes them to support a
particular political party that he has worked with for the last 9 years.12. Multiple
leaders claimed they have to “force them (residents), if not tell them what the best
option is”13 because “there is some impact or a political agreement of support in
exchange for something of interest to the community.”14 Other respondents framed
their work squarely in pro-social terms. They felt that alliances with political can-
didates were a key opportunity for local leaders to make their communities better,
and that informing residents of the best politician for their neighborhood was an









for that.”15 Most leaders framed their decision to work with political candidates
as generating strategic relationships and improving neighborhood services.
Multiple respondents claimed that vote-buying, where people were paid cash to
vote for certain candidates, was an unsavory practice that they did not participate
in and drew clear normative lines between paying cash for votes and mobilizing in
support of neighborhood projects, which respondents viewed much more positively.
One leader described their reluctance but dependence on mobilizing voters by
saying:
“Well I am very respectful.... It’s obvious that one has to do politics
because one should have strategic allies to assist with the work of them,
the politicians, in order to bring good action to the neighborhood. In
other words, for the sake of creating a good reputation in the com-
munity, not selling the vote, not saying: ‘Give me the vote so I can
give myself a stipend’, I don’t respect that. The community is simply
motivated to say: ‘This person seems ideal to represent us’, and that
with that seat we will have a friend, a strategic ally for the solution of
our problems in the community, which these days I am reflecting on
with this COVID situation, right?”16




Colombia, and leaders point to brokerage work as the best opportunity to extract
public goods from an often unresponsive state, but their nuanced opinions on the
topic raise an important question in my dissertation: when is it appropriate to call
community leaders brokers? In the dissertation I use the most expansive definition
of broker within the political science literature on this topic - a person who con-
nects potential supporters with candidates for public office. This definition leaves
out quid pro quo exchanges of votes for benefits, which is an essential compo-
nent of Clientelistic brokers. The distinction on whether something of value was
exchanged is key to understanding normative questions surrounding the role of
brokers in democratic politics. Connecting voters with candidates they may wish
to support facilitates information needed for democracy to function smoothly. Par-
ticularly in Colombia, where elections for national Senate seats feature over 1,000
registered candidates, brokerage services promote democracy by providing over-
whelmed voters with information about those running.
When physical or monetary benefits are exchanged for votes, the transaction
crosses into a normative grey area for me. Many “brokers” I spoke with de-
scribed how their community deliberated together to decide how they would vote
and what they wanted in return as a community. For poor neighborhoods, this
form of agency is more impactful than distant policy proclamations. Given that
perceptions of corruption are incredibly high in Colombia, ensuring that politicians
respond to neighborhood needs in order to win elections is a reasonable response
15
to an imperfect democracy. Perpetuating a system where those with connections,
or those who live in neighborhoods that lend themselves well to brokerage are the
only ones who receive benefits, however, is clearly undesirable. As is one where
clean candidates lack the chance to create more just or equitable systems because
striking transactional deals is a prerequisite for power.
Issues over the equitable distribution of resources are systemic, rather than chal-
lenges that individuals alone can solve. With that in mind, I have tried to avoid
assessments of whether the people featured in my dissertation are “democratic”
or “good people.” Some leaders are clearly ineffective at generating resources
from outside their communities, in part because of their own strong moral stances
against striking political bargains around elections. Residents that I interviewed at
the beginning of my field work sometimes claimed that their neighborhood leader
was inequitable in the way they distributed resources, and made unsubstanti-
ated claims that leaders were pocketing resources from politicians or coporations
- something that I could not verify or deny. Rather than adjudicating CAB leader
behavior, I urge readers to see local leaders as making individual decisions that
respond to a challenging environment characterized by differing constraints and
opportunities.
1.1 Data in the Dissertation
Data and insights in this dissertation came from close to a year and a half of
field work in two cities in Colombia: Bogotá and Santa Marta. Communal Ac-
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tion Boards were not my original research topic when I started my field work in
Colombia, but it soon became apparent that CABs are crucial to the way that
people in peripheral communities navigate and interpret the state and politics.
Not featured in this dissertation are countless conversations with residents sur-
rounding the urban core of Santa Marta, exploratory interviews with particularly
active community leaders, car rides with bureaucrats, visits to the city planning
office, and long afternoon chats with the man responsible for interlocuting with
all of Santa Marta’s communal action boards. Only after a year of digesting this
ethnographic-style data was I able to build internally valid surveys and structured
interviews that form the basis of the chapters featured in my dissertation.
Data from chapter two comes from a survey and interviews with communal ac-
tion board leaders within Santa Marta, the capital city of the Department of
Magdalena, while data from chapter three come from other cities and villages in
Magdalena. Chapter four is largely composed of publicly available data including
GIS maps of Bogotá’s communal action boards and block-level SES strata, Bo-
gotá’s communal action board membership status dataset, and table-level election
results from the 2018 Senate race.
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Table 1.2: Data Sources Featured
Santa Marta Communal Action Board Survey
This data was collected within the urban sector of Santa Marta,
Colombia between March 2020 and July 2020. The survey in-
strument was originally designed to use face-to-face interviews
and would have sampled from a complete list of neighborhoods
in Santa Marta through home visits with communal leaders. We
were able to sample 38 responses before the first case of COVID-19
was identified in Colombia and we had to switch to phone surveys.
My research assistants and I attended training sessions for com-
munal action board leaders on communal action board elections
that were meant to be held in July, as well as public health train-
ings preparing for the arrival of COVID-19 and collected phone
numbers for current CAB presidents, which we relied upon after
the switch to phone surveys. Those phone numbers served as the
starting point for snowball sampling to reach the remaining 64
leaders included in the phone survey.
The survey instrument features descriptive data about the leader
and their neighborhood as well as long-form structured interview
questions that were recorded using a voice recorder or notes de-
pending on the respondent’s preferences. The survey instrument
for face-to-face interviews featured a conjoint experiment where
respondents were handed tablets and asked to choose between two
candidates of varying characteristics six different times. To facil-
itate questions over the phone, I switched to paired comparisons
of two different characteristics.
Data from this survey is mostly used in Chapter 3, though some
insights from the interview portion were used in other chapters.
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Magdalena Communal Action Board Survey
This data was collected in other towns and villages in the Depart-
ment of Magdalena outside Santa Marta, between November 2020
and April 2021. I procured a list of phone numbers for all regis-
tered communal action boards in Magdalena and received verbal
permission from the community affiars office for the Governor of
Magdalena to contact CAB leaders. After a slow start attempting
to randomly select phone numbers off the list, we decided to select
cities and villages in order of their expected cell phone coverage
and focused on contacting all valid contact numbers within the
municipal area. The municipalities include Aracataca, Cienega,
Zona Bananera, El Banco, Plato, Fundación, Chivolo, and Algar-
robo. In total we contacted 87 communal action board leaders.
The survey instrument features descriptive data about the leader
and their neighborhood as well as long-form structured interview
questions that were recorded using a voice recorder or notes de-
pending on the respondent’s preferences.
Data from this survey is mostly used in Chapter 2, though some
insights from the interview portion were used in other chapters.
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Spatial Data on CABs, Polling Places, and Economic Strata
This data is publicly available through the city of Bogotá’s on-
line spatial database found at https://mapas.bogota.gov.co/.
This database includes three maps of Bogotá used in my disser-
tation: Salones Comunales, Puestos de Votación, and Estratifi-
cación. Communal meetings rooms (Salones Comunales) are spa-
tial points that represent the “headquarters” for neighborhood
communal action boards. Some meeting rooms are more formal
neighborhood activity centers while others are individual leader
addresses. I ensured that the communal meeting room addresses
matched the contact details on each CAB in Bogotá available
at http://plataforma.participacionbogota.gov.co/ (regis-
tration required). The polling place spatial points data available
online (Puestos de Votación) had been updated to reflect polling
places for the 2019 local elections, but the results data I used
was from the 2018 national elections. To rectify discrepancies,
I checked each address by hand and updated polling place loca-
tions that appeared to have changed from 2018 to 2019. Finally, I
used Manzana or city-block level data on social welfare strata for
Bogotá. Social welfare strata ranges from 1-5, with 5 being the
wealthiest areas of the country to 1 being the poorest.
Data from this survey is used in Chapter 4
My lead research assistant, Arianna De Luque, provided much needed local con-
text and insight from Santa Marta. She helped structure the survey questions
to make them interprettable to the research population, helped to design safe re-
search protocols, and assisted in interpretting and analyzing the responses. Her
participation in the research, from early conversations with community residents
to managing the data collection process was integral to the final product. All
errors are, of course, my own.
20
Chapter Summaries
Chapter 2: A Typology of Social Leader Accountability
In chapter two I create a typology of broker accountability that helps to explain
conflicting claims on broker behavior in existing literature. Looking at social lead-
ers as purely motivated by community preferences or as cogs in a political machine
glosses over important motivations that determine how people in predominantly
poor and middle-income neighborhoods experience politics and results in illfitting
empirical findings. Instead, I map social leaders who act as brokers across four
types - constrained, patronage-motivated, social-oriented, and autonomous - based
on the level of accountability they face from communities and candidates for pub-
lic office. I apply the framework to explore issues of effective social leadership -
whether leaders have upward connections to the state through understanding for-
mal bureaucratic channels or access to favor networks.
Chapter 3: Do Elections for Brokers Yield Better Candidates for Public
Office?
Chapter three explores the impact of elections for social leaders on their engage-
ment with politics. Previous work has suggested that elections for local brokers
push brokers to generate community development. I build on this finding to ex-
plore the impact of social leader elections on local and national politics, specifically
whether elections push social leaders into brokerage positions and downplay cor-
ruption in candidate profiles. I find that elections for social leaders encourages
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them to participate in political mobilization and results in those who opt out of
mobilizing serving only one term, but cannot definitely state whether the impact
of elections is causal or instead a product of certain leader types selecting out
of running again. I also use two discrete choice experiments to explore the im-
pact of elections on broker choice in the kinds of candidates they engage with. I
show that leaders who plan to run for reelection are slightly more likely to choose
candidates who promise local neighborhood investments, even at the expense of
electing a “clean” candidate compared to their retiring peers. The two results
taken together caution against encouraging more formal election mechanisms for
community leaders as elections may be perpetuating the involvement of communal
leaders in contractual exchanges of votes for public goods.
Chapter 4: The Impact of Brokerage Density on Signalling Support at
the Polls
Chapter four maps brokerage density (using communal action board meeting places
as a proxy) at the polling place level to show that dense polling stations, pre-
viously believed to be less monitorable and therefore less active for clientelistic
brokerage, see higher levels of indicators suggesting robust voter mobilization ef-
forts. I show that dense polling places have more votes for “downlist” candidates
in open-list proportional races and are more competitive overall than comparable
polling stations with fewer brokers, controlling for the wealth of the vicinity sur-
rounding the polling place and polling place size. Adding two additional brokers
per polling place adds the equivalent of 1 additional candidate actively competing
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at the polling place, and decreases the vote share of party leaders compared to
lower-listed party candidates by 1%. This finding contributes to the literature in
clientelistic brokerage by presenting a novel way of thinking about how brokers
can signal their effort using polling place election returns and providing novel data
on the distribution of political brokers through geographic space.
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CHAPTER II
A Typology of Social Leader Accountability
2.1 Introduction
Considering community leaders as driven solely by social-advancement motives or
purely patronage motives can cause us to miss subtle differences that explain vari-
ation in social leader behavior and performance. This chapter places community
leaders on a two-dimensional accountability spectrum that considers the relation-
ship between community leaders and both the community that appoints them,
and the electorally motivated politicians who often fund their work. Accountabil-
ity in these two directions is key to understanding the immense variation in the
functioning of community organizations – ranging from effective social leaders who
translate community needs into community improvement to leaders for community
organizations that exist on paper only. Specifically, I demonstrate that variation
in accountability produces different types of neighborhood leaders that map onto
distinct experiences and show how this framework can help explain competing
explanations about broker behavior from across the discipline. I also apply this
framework to explore how two elements of effective social leadership – knowledge
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of rules and regulations to request improvements (formal resource access) and
political-bureaucratic influence to be able to receive favors from those in power
(informal resource access) relate to the type of accountability that a neighborhood
leader faces.
Scholarship that isolates just one of the principal-agent relationships that brokers
face leaves us wit h too few tools to understand community leaders who don’t al-
ways act like extensions of political machines. Party bosses are reliant on brokers
to execute their voter mobilization work because of their superior local knowledge
(though recent work by Brierley and Nathan (2019) question the true knowledge
level of brokers), but this knowledge gap allows brokers to behave opportunistically
by redirecting mobilization funds to expenditures that are more beneficial to the
broker’s local political plans rather than as the party boss intended (Camp, 2017;
Novaes, 2018; Stokes et al., 2013; Szwarcberg, 2012, 2015). In response to this
information asymmetry, party bosses favor working with brokers whose efforts can
be monitored at the polling station level (Larreguy et al., 2016) and face trade-
offs between employing brokers who are knowledgeable and brokers who are loyal
(Camp, 2017; Brierley and Nathan, 2019). Recent literature in brokerage has also
emphasized the socially beneficial effects of accountability between brokers and
the communities they mobilize (Auerbach, 2016; Gottlieb, 2017; Nathan, 2019).
This chapter contributes to these recent advances by explicitly considering varia-
tion in both dimensions of accountability simultaneously. With this added varia-
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tion we can highlight differences between leaders who are constrained and leaders
who are socially oriented to show how brokers who are seemingly accountable to
communities might face difficulty generating cash for community investment from
politicians, while brokers who are accountable to politicians might lack community
relationships to make positive change in the neighborhood.
Community leaders are accountable to both the community that (s)elects lead-
ers based on their ability to promote investment in community development, and
electorally-minded politicians who fund the bulk of this work. Even within the
same formal institutional structure, community leaders vary in how accountable
they are to the communities they represent – ranging from robust competition in
community leadership elections to uncontested or even outright fraudulent elec-
tions. Community leaders also vary in accountability to party bosses that contract
with them based on factors like the characteristics of polling stations assigned to
the neighborhood, the size of the neighborhood voting bloc, and whether leaders
have external offers from other candidates. Variation across these two dimensions
maps on to four different stylized types of community leaders and has implications
for the ability of local leaders to extract resources from the state and political
candidates.
Colombia’s communal action boards (CABs) make an ideal case to understand
the theoretical implications of accountability because they share the same for-
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mal standards across the country but still show wide variation in community and
politician accountability, as well as in their ability to generate community develop-
ment. Created with the purpose of expanding state control into peripheral parts
of the country, communal action boards are constitutionally mandated outlets for
communities to express neighborhood-level needs to higher levels of government.
Within the same city, CABs range from a form of collective self-governance to
extensions of a political machine and the tenure of leaders is highly variable. The
competitiveness of neighborhood CAB leadership elections varies, as does the abil-
ity of leaders to switch political camps or receive benefits from non-elected actors
and therefore extract higher prices for their community’s electoral support.
The preliminary data collection for this work occurred came from lowland and
mountainous areas of the department of Magdalena and was informed by a year
of field work in the capital city of Santa Marta. Santa Marta and the rest of
Magdalena are an ideal study site because the location has two active political
machines – the Mello/Cotes family that is allied with the powerful Char clan of
Barranquilla and Carlos Caicedo’s Fuerza Ciudadana that brought a new style
of politics to the region (Valencia Agudelo, 2020). Mobilization efforts from the
two machines generate options for local brokers. Furthermore, during Caicedo’s
tenure, the dominant form of voter mobilization transitioned from mostly cash
payments to increasing promises of neighborhood-level investments, which shifted
political power to local CAB leaders rather than city-wide campaign workers. Dur-
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ing the data collection period, Magdalena experienced historic droughts, floods,
the COVID-19 pandemic, an influx of refugees from Venezuela and national and
local elections, all of which heightened the role of grassroots leadership in the city’s
daily political life.
I create a typology of community organizations varying on two dimensions of ac-
countability – accountability to community and accountability to politicians or
parties. Interviews with neighborhood residents, municipal bureaucrats, party
operatives, and social leaders inform the typology. I place community organiza-
tions in the typology using a surveys and interviews with an original sample of
88 community leaders and explore the typology’s empirical implications for both
community-driven development and electoral politics.
Placing leaders along this typology reveals an unequal distribution across the types.
Patronage-captured leaders, who are accountable to political parties or candidates
but not to their own communities are a minority of the leaders I spoke with. In-
stead, the plurality of leaders (38) are social-oriented because they have alternative
sources for resources besides elected officials but must face challengers to keep their
leadership position. Twenty leaders face both sources of accountability, while 23
face neither. Leaders from each type largely vary on their level of bureaucratic
knowledge, with some confidently navigating state and municipal bureaucracy and
others feeling as if the state is inaccessible. Patronage-captured leaders had the
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greatest access to favors from local officials, while autonomous leader were largely
unable to request favors. Combined, these results show striking variation in the
degree to which leaders could bring resources into their communities. While social-
oriented local leaders who face elections may have more local legitimacy, they and
more autonomous leaders often describe themselves as ineffective at bringing in
resources from outside the community. Patronage-captured leaders tend to fare
far better, despite lacking community-based accountability. These results raise
further questions as to the role of elections, both for neighborhood leadership and
for public office, in generating tangible improvements in poor neighborhoods.
While I build and test the theory with a formal institution that is constitutionally
recognized by the state, this could extend to a wide variety of other community
organizations so long as they a) exist indefinitely or outside of individual devel-
opment projects, b) represent a community that has a sufficient level of electoral
competition and c) operate in a context where it is appropriate for community or-
ganizations to engage in political mobilization. Some community-driven develop-
ment initiatives for specific projects by-pass local leadership to avoid elite capture.
In these short-term cases, local committees may not have enough exposure to be
co-opted into brokerage networks or their tenure may not overlap with election sea-
son, which would limit the impact of politicians as principals. Social leaders who
work within areas that lack real political competition may also lack relationships
with politicians because candidates can easily win reelection without expenditures
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on voter mobilization. While the theory in part seeks to explain when community
organizations engage in politics, in some cultural contexts community organiza-
tions are exclusively apolitical. The theory put forth in this chapter requires some
degree of permissiveness of community organization involvement in electoral poli-
tics. Many forms of communal organizations fit these criteria within and outside
of Latin America ranging from local brokers in Senegal (Gottlieb, 2017) to slum
captains in India (Auerbach, 2016).
This typology and empirical analysis contribute to the literature on communal
organizations by fully theorizing the variation in political and social involvement
of community leaders. Within comparative politics, community leaders have been
depicted as appendages of political machines (Stokes et al., 2013; Szwarcberg,
2012), political mobilizers held captive by requests from residents (Nichter and
Peress, 2017), altruistic community-driven negotiators (Baldwin, 2018; Auerbach,
2017), and caciques (Knight and Pansters, 2005). While these examples come from
multiple case contexts, this work studies the theoretical conditions under which
this variation can co-occur within the same administrative division (department,
in this case). By placing altruistic community leaders and mobilizers for political
machines on the same dimension, I highlight potential explanations for previously
incompatible findings (for instance, Brokers in Argentina are thought to know vote
choices, but data from Ghana suggests they do not). A typology featuring both po-
litical machines and socially oriented community leaders bridges the gap between
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narrowly focused studies of vote-buying to much larger discussions of group-level
political behavior.
The tension in this chapter between accountability and effectiveness contributes to
long-standing normative questions in political science on finding the right balance
between community-level control and effective leadership that inform practical
questions surrounding the best local governance designs for community develop-
ment projects. While advocates of increasing democratic accountability point to its
constraining effect on leader behavior, the empirical puzzle remains – accountable
and motivated leaders are not always able to generate improvements in neighbor-
hoods. Instead, I join a growing field of social scientists studying the drawbacks
to electoral-based accountability schemes by pointing to skills that leaders develop
through tenure in office and their ability to leverage their position for greater ac-
cess to resources.
Finally, the study joins recent work in generating publicly accessible data on neigh-
borhood and community level governance in Latin America. Despite their role as
interlocutors of state resources in local communities throughout the region, little
work within the discipline has seriously considered the role of Communal Action
Board leaders in Colombia outside of non-state insurgencies (Arjona, 2016; Vargas,
2019). As key access points to the state, gathering systematic data on the polit-
ical and social leadership roles can shed a valuable descriptive light on quotidian
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interaction with authority across much of Latin America.
2.2 Literature Review
Party bosses and political operatives face an information problem when contracting
with local organization leaders to engage in voter mobilization, and this informa-
tion problem affects the level of accountability between the two. Party bosses in
many cases need local brokers to mobilize voters because they lack direct link-
ages with voters and believe -at times, incorrectly (Brierley and Nathan, 2019)-
that local brokers have better information about voter propensity and greater per-
suasiveness among the community of target voters. When broker incentives do
not align with those of political bosses, the information asymmetries allow bro-
kers to both misrepresent the true size of their voting bloc and opportunistically
distribute resources for mobilizing votes in ways that benefit the local broker’s
following rather than the party’s (Stokes et al., 2013). Because broker shirking
is very costly for politicians, they prefer to work with monitorable brokers, but
brokers who can credibly threaten to switch camps generate the highest returns
(Camp, 2017). The literature outlines three primary categories to evaluate the
accountability between brokers and the politicians who contract with them: in-
centive alignment, monitoring of vote tallies, and the loyalty of voting blocs to
brokers.
Party bosses can attempt to align the incentives of local brokers and the party such
that monitoring broker behavior is unnecessary. Creating promotional incentives
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by incorporating brokers into the political party can align incentives such that the
party’s success is shared by the broker (Szwarcberg, 2012). Community leaders as
brokers sometimes desire cushier and more powerful positions as city councilors
and so, with the promise of a spot on the next ballot, consider the electoral success
of a party to be personally beneficial to them. Parties can also choose to work
with brokers whose incentives naturally align with parties (Holland and Palmer-
Rubin, 2015). Brokers representing organizations like labor unions in a two-party
system may have the organizational capacity to switch their voting bloc to an-
other candidate, but that threat lacks credibility if the other candidate’s politics
is unpalatable to the group. Particularly for agreements with brokers representing
voter blocs that are not geographically concentrated, incentive alignment helps
overcome information asymmetry.
Political operatives can also overcome information asymmetries by monitoring bro-
ker behavior using polling station vote tallies. When judging the impact of brokers
on vote tallies, smaller polling stations provide a clearer picture of broker perfor-
mance. Because polling station size is often known in advance of the election,
political bosses target their resources towards brokers who will mobilize voters
at smaller and therefore more monitorable polling stations (Larreguy et al., 2016;
Rueda, 2017).1 The ability for campaigns to monitor broker performance in theory
reduces shirking, but it does not necessarily improve the potential for mobilization.
1The ability for brokers to signal effort at polling places is something I address in more detail
in Chapter 3
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Brokers with loyal voting blocs are less accountable to politicians who employ them
because they can credibly threaten to switch political camps at any time (Camp,
2017). Because brokers with the most local influence often come with the greatest
risk of defection, political operatives face a dilemma: they can choose to employ
brokers who are highly accountable to them but are ineffective at mobilizing large
groups of voters, or they can pay increasingly high costs for effective brokers who
are disloyal (Camp, 2017; Novaes, 2018).
In addition to accountability to political operatives, brokers are also accountable
to the community that (s)elects them. Even without formal elections for commu-
nity leadership, leaders with a larger group selecting them are expected to promote
greater provision of public goods, though there are some notable exceptions (Bald-
win and Mvukiyehe, 2015). Local leaders exert effort that generates greater com-
munity development when they are held accountable the community (Zarazaga,
2014; Auerbach, 2016; Gottlieb, 2017; Nichter and Peress, 2017; Nathan, 2019).
The accountability of local leaders to the community varies based on the selection
process and the importance of local leadership in the area. Hereditary and other-
wise non-competitive local leadership selection reduces accountability to the local
community because leaders who lack competition can remain with the support of
only a narrow part of the community and therefore the alignment of preferences
34
between voters and brokers is not credible (Gottlieb, 2017). In contrast, an increas-
ing strand of literature has identified cases where traditional means of leadership
selection improve accountability without formal elections (Baldwin and Holzinger,
2019; Baldwin, 2018; Murtazashvili, 2016; Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015; Dı́az-
Cayeros et al., 2014). Traditional means of selecting local leaders without a secret
ballot in some cases can promote even greater accountability through frequent,
deliberative, and collective decision-making rather than citizen involvement only
once every few years (Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015; Dı́az-Cayeros et al., 2014).
In circumstances without regular competitive elections, local leaders can still be
held accountable to the community through social sanctioning mechanisms (Tsai,
2007) and norms of deliberative decision-making. Similarly, when residents are
not reliant on grassroots leadership to generate improvement in their area, they
may lack motivation to sanction local leaders who do not perform.
Unaccountable leaders who are not subject to any form of social sanctioning by res-
idents can still be prolific vote mobilizers through coercion. Negative inducements
including removal from public employment, social exclusion, and even violence are
common broker strategies and can be more effective than positive inducements at
mobilizing voters (Mares and Young, 2016a). Gottlieb finds that brokers in Sene-
gal who are more economically independent from voters are more likely to employ
coercion as a strategy when they lack the credibility to use persuasion due to the
absence of community accountability (2017). Coercion allows local leaders who
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are unaccountable to the community to mobilize large numbers of voters without
persuasion or local legitimacy.
Combining these two branches of the clientelism literature by examining broker
accountability holistically can shed light on a contradiction that I encountered in
my field work. Sometimes the most effective local leaders in generating resources
for development projects were seemingly unmotivated by leadership elections be-
cause they were sure no one would run against them. At the same time, leaders
facing highly contested elections lacked the cash and grants needed to invest in
their communities.
This work also is informed by practical gaps in the community driven development
literature. Development organizations increasingly partner with local community
groups to promote community-driven development, but these partnerships often
fall short of lofty expectations for economic development, social cohesion, and ac-
countable governance (Levine, 2021; White et al., 2018). Scholars and practitioners
in community development have found that poorly designed community participa-
tion schemes merely mimic pre-existing community power structures that exclude
minority voices and suffer from elite capture (Bosancianu et al., 2019; Buntaine
et al., 2018).
A narrow focus on community leaders as either socially oriented actors or sources
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of elite corruption impacts the return on the World Bank’s multibillion-dollar in-
vestment in community-driven development. Since the 1960’s grassroots social
leaders have been held aloft by the international and development-policy commu-
nity as key partners in equitable development (Binswanger-Mkhize and de Regt,
2010). Community-driven development programs that work with local actors can
fall short in achieving equitable results due to elite-capture where choices that are
meant to be decided through community consensus are redirected by local leader-
ship (White et al., 2018; Bosancianu et al., 2019; Buntaine et al., 2018). Designs
that attempt to by-pass local leadership to avert elite capture instead can suffer
from a lack of local relational capital and local organizational knowledge that local
leaders often best provide (Madajewicz et al., 2017).
Designers of community-driven development plans attempt to work around elite
capture by establishing standalone project-based committees rather than work-
ing with pre-existing community organizations. As a result, these efforts sideline
leaders who can provide valuable local knowledge, lend trust in the community,
and effectively sanction non-compliers(Madajewicz et al., 2017; Mansuri and Rao,
2012).2 Less research thus far has explored the conditions under which we should
expect elite capture to divert resources away from potential beneficiaries if they
were chosen by the community in a deliberative process. This gap has important
2The city of Santa Marta often employs this tactic by asking communities to establish a
committee of residents apart from the Communal Action Board president before they can receive
grants from the city. Critics claim this policy is selectively employed in areas where the board
president has connections with other political movements.
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practical implications because by-passing elites out of fear of elite capture can
harm these communal institutions in the long-term while losing the local expertise
of social leaders in the short-term.
In what cases should we expect local leadership to reflect community interests, and
when should we expect elite capture to remain an issue? By placing community
organizations in the larger political context, we can better predict the size and
direction of CDD discrepancy and minimize the tradeoff between elite influence
and elite knowledge.
A Typology of Community Leader Accountability
Social leaders, formally or informally, need the backing of a portion of the com-
munity to maintain their leadership position, but often rely on politicians for the
revenue needed for community-improvements. In some cases, leaders are elected to
their positions through secret-ballots, while in other cases social leaders informally
maintain influence over a group of people. In either case, if community members
no longer think the leadership is doing a good job the community can, under con-
ditions of accountability, replace leadership with someone they think may perform
better.
I consider a social leader to be accountable to the community if some of the
following conditions are met:
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1. Community members are knowledgeable about the behavior of local social
leaders
2. Community members can effectively remove social leaders from their position
due to poor performance
3. Community members have multiple outside options to go to for leadership
(for example, if the local religious leader is also mobilizing votes and gener-
ating self-governance)
Hosting activities and solving community problems are a large part of how com-
munity members evaluate community leader performance, but these activities re-
quire resources. Informally, community leaders receive much of their revenue for
community development through mobilizing voters on behalf of politicians to cre-
ate indebtedness between the politician and community. This capital can come
through varied forms of political patronage – ranging from pork-barrel politics
to voter mobilization budgets. When social leaders need this revenue and these
relationships to comply with development demands from within the community,
social leaders are often accountable to politicians as well.
I consider a social leader to be accountable to politicians if the following conditions
are met:
1. Social leaders need resources from politicians (lack outside or programmatic
resource options)
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2. Voter mobilization efforts are highly monitorable in the aggregate at local
polling stations and social leaders cannot credibly threaten to back other
candidates (preference misalignment, disloyal or small voting bloc, core party
neighborhood, etc)
3. OR Politicians have multiple outside options for brokerage (for example, a
local religious leader)
We can demonstrate the varied levels of accountability with the typology be-
low:











As accountability shifts from high (H) to low (L) across both axes, community
leaders become more autonomous, but this autonomy could come at a cost. As
accountability to politicians decreases, risk-averse political candidates skeptical of
free-agents and unmonitorable brokers will be less willing to risk their mobilization
resources, but brokers will be more able to credibly threaten to transfer their vot-
ing blocs. To compensate for increased risk, brokers can signal a large voting bloc
through rally attendance and local meetings, but not all brokers have sufficient
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community influence to accomplish this.
Along the opposite axis, community leaders are less reliant on promoting local
development to keep their positions when accountability is low but can remain in
their positions long-term which helps develop political relationships. Community
leader accountability to both the community they serve and the politicians they
mobilize voters for moderates their ability to develop local community knowledge
through experience and the relationships needed to ask for a favor, which has key
impacts on pro-development outcomes. Below I describe each of the “ideal type”
social leaders and how accountability may constrain their behavior.
Grassroots community organizations are often meant to be social-oriented or-
ganizations – accountable to the community and working with politicians, but
not accountable to them. Social-oriented community groups who are unhappy
working with one politician can credibly threaten to transfer their voting-bloc to
another candidate, or they may have alternative sources of revenue such that they
do not need revenue from politicians at all. Community members in this high level
community accountability environment can pressure social-oriented leadership to
gain tangible development improvements and can replace leaders with poor per-
formance, so leaders frequently face re-election challenges.
Grassroots organizations that are highly accountable to both politicians and the
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community are constrained in their behavior. This position is difficult as the
politician can withhold sources of funding to the community and community mem-
bers can vote or otherwise remove the incumbent from their leadership position.
Constrained social leaders are limited in generating community improvements for
two reasons. They lack the ability to negotiate high rates in return for their mo-
bilization work because political bosses can choose to work with other mobilizers
or leaders cannot credibly threaten to switch political camps. Because they face
competitive re-election prospects, leader turnover reduces the community and bu-
reaucratic knowledge needed to ask for and receive the right assistance.
Patronage-captured grassroots organizations operate as extensions of a party
or candidate political machine and allocate community revenue in ways that will
help the politicians they work with. When the political machine has seats in local
government, grassroots leaders have access to state resources for development, but
lack these resources when the party loses elections. Patronage-captured grassroots
leaders can move up the party ranks by earning a position on the party’s ballot, so
their leadership tenure can be short despite few opportunities for the community
to vote them out. Much of the literature on brokerage assumes that brokers fall
in this cell.
Autonomous local leaders face few constraints on their behavior but lack the
accountability-induced incentives to improve public goods in the community. Au-
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tonomous leaders can come in many forms, ranging from decentralized despots
to leaders that exist on paper only. These autonomous social leaders hold their
positions for long periods of time and build up immense local knowledge, while
political bosses who want to secure votes in the locality have few alternatives to
partnering with them.
Established literature in political science considers a wide range of different actors
who could fall along this typology, but most works lack conceptual clarity on how
the actors involved differ from those in other parts of the literature. Considering
the many different types of brokers featured in prominent literature on clientelism
results in contradictory findings from across contexts. For instance, in just Adam
Auerbach’s work in India, he looks at partisan broker networks that I categorize as
patronage-captured, and slum development committee leaders who I might catego-
rize as social-oriented. Both actors are brokers, and yet have remarkably different
constraints and motivations. Similarly Szwarcberg’s work in Argentina depicts
brokers with enormous power to withhold access to welfare, whereas in Brazil
Nichter and Peress find that brokers there feel they must fulfil every voter request
or fear losing their position. While more work looks at variation in accountability
in one direction (for instance, Gottlieb (2017 or Nathan (2019), exploring both
sources of accountability simultaneously may result in different findings.
In the following table, I place 30 prominent works in the clientelism literature on
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the typology of social leader accountability. In many cases, authors do not provide
enough detail in order to assess whether brokers in their study actually face any
degree of accountability, but the theoretical insights and assumptions in each piece
make it possible to assign my interpretation of the author’s conception of leader
type. I also include works that explicitly consider variation in broker type across
just one accountability spectrum (community or political accountability), but in
most of these cases it’s impossible to know whether the actors in the study faced
additional sources of accountability.
Table 2.2: Constrained Leaders in Prominent Literature
• (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015)
• (Nichter and Peress, 2017)
• (Szwarcberg, 2012)
Table 2.3: Social-Oriented Leaders in Prominent Literature
• (Auerbach, 2017)
• (Baldwin and Holzinger, 2019)
• (Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015)
• (Dı́az-Cayeros et al., 2014)
• (Gottlieb, 2017)





Table 2.4: Autonomous Leaders in Prominent Literature
• (Baldwin, 2013)
• (Baldwin, 2018)
• (Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015)
• (Bowles et al., 2020)
• (Dı́az-Cayeros et al., 2014)
• (Gottlieb, 2017)





Table 2.5: Patronage-Captured Leaders in Prominent Literature
• (Auerbach, 2016)
• (Auyero, 2000)
• (Bowles et al., 2020)
• (Brierley and Nathan, 2019)
• (Brusco et al., 2004)
• (Calvo and Murillo, 2013)
• (Camp, 2017)
• (Camp et al., 2014)
• (Dı́az-Cayeros et al., 2014)
• (Kramon, 2016)
• (Larreguy et al., 2016)
• (Lawson and Greene, 2014)
• (Oliveros, 2016)
• (Stokes, 2005)





Data in this chapter comes from multiple sources gathered over the course of a
year in the field and through phone surveys. The primary source of data comes
from an original survey fielded in the Fall of 2020 with modules aimed specifi-
cally at placing social leaders on the accountability axes and measuring their level
of formal and informal access points for resources: bureaucratic knowledge and
ability to request favors. The results are supported by insights gleaned from 128
neighborhood leader interviews in the city of Santa Marta (March – May 2020),
participant observation in the local affairs office in the city of Santa Marta (Spring
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2019), and semi-structured interviews with neighborhood residents in select pe-
ripheral parts of the capitol (Fall and Spring 2019).
Divining the true level of accountability that social leaders face, particularly in
relation with each other, is difficult through remote phone surveys. To best ap-
proximate these forces, I design two accountability indexes and use them to place
social leader respondents on the X and Y accountability axes described in the ty-
pology. Questions were chosen to be non-sensitive and relatable to local leaders
based on participant observation and qualitative research throughout 2019. To
protect privacy and prevent legal concerns, I avoid asking questions that explic-
itly tie a respondent’s role as a local CAB leader to partisan political involvement
through vote buying, though personal involvement in campaigns apart from their
professional leadership capacity is considered legitimate (Field Notes, March 2020).
Each item in the index is expected to have face and content validity, sufficient vari-
ance to be informative and measure different manifestations of the same underlying
concept, though all questions suffer somewhat from social desirability bias. I was
unable to “fact-check” claims made by leaders during these interviews, so all data
should be interpreted as representing the respondents’ views of their own behavior,
successes, and challenges.
While I theoretically describe community accountability as being more expansive
than just elections, in practice I was unable to collect valid and informative details
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about non-electoral accountability for local CAB leaders. Instead, I rely entirely
on three survey questions judging competitive selection and competitive reelection.
I assign accountability scores of 0, 1, and 2 based on an additive index including
the following points:
1. In the previous election, did people run against you? (+1 if yes)
2. Are you running for reelection? If so, is someone running against you? (+1
if yes)
Similarly, I constructed an imperfect political accountability index mapping onto
theoretical components, including whether the CAB needs resources from politi-
cians and local government or maintains an outside option and their belief on
whether politicians can tell how people in their community voted. Similar to com-
munity accountability, I was unable to capture the concept holistically with the
survey and interviews conducted given social-desirability bias and the difficulty in
judging whether leaders in fact required resources from political candidates and
local officials. Instead, I assign political accountability scores of 0,1, and 2 based
on the following information:
1. Did the respondent mention their ability to secure resources from local com-
panies?3 If so, they receive a score of 0 for political accountability.
3These local companies mainly include Drummond, an American mining corporation, and
FENOCO, the railroad that carries the products of the mine to the port in Ciénega. The railways
cuts through the middle of Magdalena, and any JAC whose territory touches the railway line is
eligible to receive in-kind grants from the corporation as part of their state-mandated corporate
social responsibility program. Pollution from the coal has negatively affected health outcomes
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2. If they did not mention receiving resources from companies, and emphasized
that they turn to politicians or the local government for securing funding
(rather than self-generating funds), they receive a score of 1
3. If 2 is true, and they believed that it was probably, or very probable that
politicians could tell how people in their community voted, they receive a
score of 2
4. If 1 and 2 are false, they receive a score of 0.
Respondents for the survey were sampled from a comprehensive list of CAB lead-
ers in 25 municipalities (excluding the municipality of Pueblo Viejo where no cell
phone numbers were listed) in the department of Magdalena. Because the list of
leaders is near complete, the research team was able to randomly sample leaders
to be included in the survey. Each selected leader was contacted up to two times
to reduce non-response bias. Due to variation in cell phone coverage, non-response
bias is likely not “as-if random” because local conditions make phone calls more
difficult in more remote areas.
At the time of survey, Colombia had just finished six months of an intense stay-at-
home order that dramatically impacted the economy, particularly in the informal
labor market. Data for another study featured in the dissertation was collected
both before and after the stay at home order was placed, and results did not change
and infrastructure quality in the area.
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significantly despite the stress of a global pandemic. The pandemic, however, is
expected to change at least some of the behavior of local leaders. During the stay at
home order, community meetings might not have been held that otherwise would
have taken place, and I expect that CAB leadership was contacted with questions
and requests from community members at a higher rate than normal due to the
abnormal circumstances. In this period of time, the demands for services from
CAB leadership are assumed to be high. The elections for CAB leadership were
scheduled to take place in May, but have been postponed indefinitely, so some
questions about whether they know if another person planned to run against them
are much less tentative than they otherwise would have been at this point. Most
other questions asked in the survey, however, are expected to be unaffected by the
pandemic.
2.4 Placing Social Leaders Across Typology
Placing survey respondents4 along the typology reveals that the least common
form of social leader within this population is the patronage-captured type, while
the most common form of social leader is social-oriented. The rarity of patronage-
captured types underlines the importance of moving away from party machine
archetypes as the basis for theoretical work. Instead, the bulk of respondents are
constrained, social-oriented, or autonomous.
4Some respondents completed the survey but did not complete the interview or did not have
their interviews recorded properly.
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Patronage-captured leaders were a minority, but felt their political connections
were valuable resources, despite sometimes being a liability. Patronage-captured
leaders viewed working with political parties and candidates for office as a neces-
sity. A leader used the saying “he who has power is he who commands. . . we
should act politically because one receives benefits for the community when one
knows how to work with them.”9 One leader describes how his connection with
the political party not only gave him access and resources, but also provided him
training in community organizing. He points out that many of the other leaders in
the municipality had gotten positions as CAB presidents because they had secured
a number of votes for the incumbent mayor, but “90% don’t know basically what
a communal board even is and what benefits we have access to through the board
and through the government. So they’re there because they’re friends [with the
5Interviews: 1323, 2641, 5297, 5661, 5970, 6071, 7365, 752, 2871, 3301, 4008, 4228, 5889,
6687, 686, 7031, 81, 655, 6849, 9721
6Interviews: 1056, 14, 1959, 2003, 213, 2282, 2442, 2500, 3252, 3493, 3503, 3719, 3873, 4305,
4533, 5626, 6956, 7155, 7322, 7907, 8063, 8093, 8179, 8320, 859, 861, 8861, 9128, 9465, 9671,
9959, 1600, 3181, 3519, 3733, 3811, 648, 8622
7Interviews: 2186, 5451, 1112, 2188, 5726, 6009
8Interviews: 1212, 1354, 1830, 1935, 2328, 2476, 3150, 3262, 3444, 3518, 3672, 3798, 3817,
402, 4390, 4405, 5248, 5829, 687, 7259, 8158, 8627, 8701
9Interview 6009
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mayor].”10 Through the training this leader had received from a nation-wide po-
litical party, he was able to utilize formal channels to contest the neighborhood’s
social welfare subsidy (SISBEN) status with bureaucrats in Bogotá. His political
work with the party, though, left him isolated from the receiving preferential treat-
ment from the mayor’s office, controlled by a different party. Instead, his work was
mostly generated through a strong knowledge of bureaucratic channels and access
to intangible party resources and networks. Another patronage-captured leader
described his relationship with the mayor’s office as “if the [CAB] president is not
with the mayor, then forget it, you can’t fight here, because they are not going to
give you any type of royalty, they won’t give you anything.”11 While working with
campaigns can give you access to resources, backing the losing candidate is a risky
proposition for many leaders.
Constrained leaders describe a strained relationship between themselves and po-
litical candidates while downplaying the importance of JAC elections. Working
with political candidates “has not been a good experience” for one leader be-
cause candidates “come to the neighborhood looking to meet during campaigns,
and afterwards they don’t come back and they forget our needs.”12 They cite
this experience as why they are undecided about running again in the upcom-
ing election, despite winning a competitive election previously. Candidates use
constrained leaders for votes and for visibility in the community, but some CAB
10Interview 2186
11Interview 5451
12Interview 655, similar sentiment expressed in Interviews 5297 and 752 and others
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leaders are left uncomfortable with the sometimes un-democratic interplay between
electoral politics and their community work, even when it means strengthening the
community’s network of supporters and additional resources for neighborhood de-
velopment.13 Even a local leader who had previously ran for city council himself
thought “communal life should be apart from political life.”14
Leaders in this constrained category also face risks from working with candidates
that lose, and can become isolated when power shifts in mayoral elections.15 Work-
ing with political candidates can sometime even hurt a leaders local credibility
– one leader describes how a candidate who broke their promise once in office
has caused the community to lose faith in them as a CAB leader, despite being
well-informed on local politics and receiving some help from the mayor’s office.16
Despite all leaders in this category facing competitive elections or being selected
through competitive elections, very few thought elections were important in de-
termining the quality of CAB leadership, because “plenty of leaders were elected
but end up not producing any results.”17
Autonomous Leaders can be split into two groups – those that operate au-
tonomously by finding other external resources and ways to extract what is needed
from the state, and those that are isolated from external resources entirely and
13Interview 9721
14Interview 4228




left to solve problems within the community, if at all. Both groups largely agreed
that promises from politicians can’t be trusted, but some had alternative places to
go for assistance, ranging from FENOCO and Drummond18 to the army garrison
to well-connected neighbors. In these cases, some leaders had arrangements with
local city councilors, or other political candidates but treated these as additional
resources that were smaller in value or less reliable.19 Two leaders opted out of
political engagement because it wasn’t worth the effort or the conditions in their
neighborhood made political engagement difficult. One leader commented, “ac-
tually I intended to look for those kind of [political] benefits, but I saw that we
weren’t getting anything real because you know politicians, they offer help but
then once they are in their positions they become different people. I scrutinized
the issue and saw that it’s better to look for things through the law and process. . .
That’s been our lived experience around here.”20 Whereas in another community,
the mayor is of a different political group from the governor, and so the CAB
president attempted to play both sides, which created what he described as “a
contradiction.”21 All of these leaders were able to describe numerous public works
and areas of success, many involving extensive bureaucratic knowledge.
18FENOCO (Ferrocarriles del Norte de Colombia S.A.) is the railroad company that transports
coal across the Magdalena from the Drummund mine in Cesar Department to the Drummond port
in Ciénega, Magdalena. Both FENOCO and Drummond are required to provide community assis-
tance due to the coal dust pollution, noise, and property damage incurred while transporting coal.
The train has a long history in Magdalena: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5EwFZVnv9p4




Other autonomous leaders lament the inaccessibility of local politicians, either
because of distance or lack of social connections, and a lack of interest among their
communities. One leader commented that “at one point, we had a city council
member and people could tell him ‘Look our neighborhood lacks this and that’ and
so people at least had somebody to tell things to, right? But now, he didn’t stay a
councilor, so we are, practically, incommunicado”22 Another blamed their commu-
nities lack of familial ties: “We don’t have a political family in the neighborhood
or anything like that, so, we are really removed from the civilized world, you could
say. . . The mayor’s office has never given us the space (to contact them). . . ”23
One leader called her community “disunited” and “apathetic” but was still able
to create a number of public works using her own efforts to petition the govern-
ment, including establishing a community meeting room, bringing public gas to
the neighborhood, and a small park.24
Social-oriented leaders emphasized first their communities ability to solve prob-
lems on their own before asking for assistance from outside of the community,
claiming that “if we work together, we can accomplish a lot.”25 For example, one
leader noted that “the community always works together when there are prob-
lems in the neighborhood that affect all of us. . . between the leaders in the area
and the community, we can solve most local problems.”26 Social-oriented leaders
22Interview 5829
23Interview 3518




often worked with local government or politicians by “knocking on the doors of
the administration,’27 working “hand-in-hand” with the mayor28 and petitioning
government bureaucracy collectively. When striking deals with candidates, one
leader emphasized that they “tried to get them to give us the things before, not
after elections” since they had worked with candidates who did not comply with
the bargain in the past.29 Another leader framed his relationship with a political
candidate for city council as one that the candidate lost out on by not supporting
him enough in his campaign to be CAB president.30 Even if leaders did not con-
tribute votes to a political campaign, according to one leader, the community can
still receive things “so long as you know how to ask.”31
However, Social-oriented leaders aren’t always successful in generating resources
from local government. For example, one leader in a medium-sized municipality
describes how he missed out on opportunities because he was neutral in the pre-
vious election:
“With the previous mayor, I wasn’t an enemy of him but also not
a friend. And the result is that he had other people in mind when
sharing food baskets. . . in the previous administration. . . there was
some amount of money – 20 million pesos ( 5,500 USD), that the mayor







connection with him, and provide votes and what not. To these people
they gave 20 million pesos that the board could use to provide a public
work in the neighborhood that they needed. . . How many times did
I ask for pavement here in the neighborhood? The neighbors were
going to help out with it too, and they [the mayor] never gave me the
funds. There were many presidents of other boards that did receive
that money and they could work with that cash. Meanwhile I couldn’t
do anything because I didn’t have support. . . . I’ve always been apart,
doing things because I want to help the neighborhood, not to be part
of politics. Because, thank god, I have never had an aspiration to those
political posts or anything like that”32
Divisions among members of CABs with social-oriented leaders pose an addi-
tional threat: “Even though I won because this same community chose me, when
one wants to do an activity, the committee is very divided. . . we have to become
united so that the mayor’s office will give us some support.”33 Multiple leaders
described their role as “uniting people”34 as the prime job of the CAB president
often through a form of deliberation that was largely unique to social-oriented com-
munal action boards.35 They utilized public meetings and committees to analyze






out to the local authorities if needed rather than just the CAB leader alone, a
tactic that reduces the travel costs and burden other CAB presidents bemoaned.36
Within the same formal institution in Colombia, social leaders employed different
tactics had different ways of accessing resources and were influenced by differ-
ent sources of constraints and motivations. Viewing social leaders as homogenous
skims over important variation in determining how they interact with the political
world and generate development in their communities. The variation shown within
just one institution in one administrative unit underscores the importance for any
future work to fully consider where the study population fits along this typology.
In the next section, I demonstrate the use of this typology in empirical work by
exploring the relationship between leader type and effectiveness in generating re-
sources for local development.
2.5 Application of Typology: Are Some Leaders More Ef-
fective at Getting Resources for their Communities
than Others?
Each category of leader utilized different approaches for generating local develop-




Social leaders interviewed for this study range from incredibly effective to exas-
perated and worn down. Multiple leaders described themselves as “isolated” and
“abandoned.” One leader described their37 situation approaching local leadership
for resources as “One knocks on doors, and when one knocks not a single person
answers.”38 On the other hand, some leaders were effective and accomplished, and
brimming with pride over their community work. In just one neighborhood, a
CAB leader explained that they had achieved improvements to the public health
center, a public lighting project, road improvements, as well as access to subsidies
for the youth and elderly.39 Overall, I assessed that around 18 leaders were highly
effective at attracting resources for their communities, 25 were limited in effective-
ness, and another 23 were difficult to place on this scale because the interviews
lacked sufficient detail or the accomplishments were too narrow to consider highly
effective. The variation across communities underscores a foundational question:
why are some leaders effective and others not?
To explore this question in light of my theoretical expectations, I demonstrate the
importance of considering both sources of accountability together by looking at
the explanatory power of community accountability and political accountability
separately. I then delve into additional points of variation in terms of length of
37I purposely did not collect gender. My RAs on the ground thought it would be offensive to
ask people their gender over the phone and I did not want RAs to write down their guesses as
to the gender of the respondent. Instead, I refer to leaders as “they/them/their” throughout the
paper, unless the respondent used a gendered pronoun to refer to themselves in the interview




tenure, formal access to resources through bureaucratic knowledge, and informal
access to resources through the ability to request favors.
Variation along both axes affects neighborhood community leader performance
through two modes of accessing resources from outside the community – formal
access through bureaucratic knowledge, and informal access through relationships
of indebtedness or friendship that allow leaders to request favors from those in
positions of power. Bureaucratic knowledge is important for social leaders in un-
derstanding the process by which improvements can be requested and fulfilled. A
social leader with high bureaucratic knowledge would not only know that a water
pump is broken but would know what municipal office can help fix it, and how to
fill out the paperwork effectively. The ability for a social leader to call in a favor
is important for social leaders to affect change using resources from municipal or
political funds. Politically appointed public workers can address community issues
by raising them in priority and local politicians can use private campaign funds to
address issues or contribute to community budgets. To solve community problems
that require outside resources, a social leader likely needs a combination of both
formal and informal access points to resources. I assume that all social leaders
have sufficient knowledge on community concerns to identify necessary improve-
ments.
While the typology is widely applicable, the analysis and expectations here are gen-
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erated from the Colombian context where I found that many problems could indeed
be solved through formal bureaucratic routes if one was persistent enough. Infor-
mal access to resources through favors from political campaigns is a major mode
by which poor communities get resources they need, particularly in a timely man-
ner. At the same time, some critical neighborhood needs like electric transformers,
gas connections, victims registration, and more could be obtained through formal,
albeit complicated and time-consuming, bureaucratic means. Even in places where
formal access channels are largely ineffective, the original typology should still shed
light on motivations of community leaders but I don’t expect this application of
the typology to be applicable.
The table below summarizes expectations on the components of social leader ef-
fectiveness:
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• High informal access
I expect that communities where the social leader is constrained are limited in
formal and informal access to resources. When community leaders are unable to
generate neighborhood improvements through their patronage work, they are fre-
quently removed from leadership positions. The turnover in this position limits the
build-up of bureaucratic knowledge needed to address community needs through
formal channels. Constrained social leaders also cannot credibly threaten to switch
political camps so they have lower bargaining power in negotiating resources in
exchange for community support. I expect these communities to have less bureau-
cratic knowledge, lower tenure rates for leaders, and view themselves as unable to
request favors from local government.
Social-oriented community organizations face similar challenges access resources
formally because of the expected high turnover. Since the community cohesive-
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ness necessary to hold social leaders accountable can translate into other forms
of collective action like voter mobilization, leaders in social-oriented communities
also have a large ability to access resources informally by requesting favors from
political allies because they can credibly threaten to switch candidates in future
election rounds. I expect that social-oriented community leaders have high formal
access, moderate tenure rates, but view themselves as unable to access resources
informally from local government.
Patronage-captured social leaders work towards promotion, so I expect that they
would move out of their positions when the candidate they back wins an election,
but they have sufficient informal access to patronage resources from their connec-
tions with candidates. An emphasis on finding neighborhood solutions through
political candidates makes these leaders less knowledgeable about municipal bu-
reaucracy. I expect that patronage-captured social leaders would have limited
formal access, short tenure rates, but view themselves as able to access resources
informally through patronage networks.
Autonomous leaders face no re-election challenges despite potential poor perfor-
mance and political bosses have little recourse to mobilize voters in these commu-
nities without negotiating with local leaders. This long tenure generates formal
access throough buit-up bureaucratic knowledge so autonomous leaders often have
the tools for filing claims in municipal government. Local leaders in autonomous
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communities can access resources informally through requesting favors when they
are vital to voter mobilization, however political campaigns may eschew working
with autonomous leaders because of the risk of shirking. I expect that autonomous
leaders will have formal access to resources, long records of serving in leadership
positions, and view themselves as able to access resources informally through re-
questing favors from local government.
A summary of the observable expectations resulting from this typology is included
below:























Low High Low High
Informal
Access
Low Low High High
Overall
Effectiveness
Poor Good Average Good
The table below depicts the different measures for each element of observable
expectations from the theory. Outcomes of interest were measured through the
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interview portion of the survey. This approach of collecting long-answer responses,
while time-consuming, provides richer contextual variation in the outcomes, bet-
ter demonstrates responses on abstract outcomes like effectiveness at attracting
resources, and serve as a validity check for the survey responses.
Table 2.9: Survey questions relevant to observable expectations
Relevant Questions and Coding Decisions
Leadership
Tenure





N/A - assumed high
Formal
Access
Relevant Questions: What is the last thing someone in your
community asked you for help with? Can you usually help resi-
dents with their problems or is it not possible?
Coding Decisions: If, over the course of the interview, respon-
dents could list petitions and solicitations that they had made
that corresponded to plausibly correct entities, then assigned
“high” formal resource access. If leaders described challenges in
submitting documents, or lamented the lack of progress on their
petitions, they were described as “low.” Leaders who claimed
the distance made accessing bureaucracy difficult were coded as
“low.”
Continued on next page
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Table 2.9 – continued from previous page
Relevant Questions and Coding Decisions
Informal Ac-
cess
Relevant Questions: Do you think people in the city govern-
ment where you live would be willing to help you? When you
need something done who do you go to for help?
Coding Decisions: Leaders who described their accomplish-
ments as a result of favors were coded as “high informal access”
as were leaders who claimed they turned to friends or family-
members to help them access resources from outside the commu-
nity. Importantly, this does not include leaders who asked their
neighbors to chip-in on developing public goods. Leaders who
explicitly lamented their isolation or lack of relationships with




Coding Decisions: Holistic approach judging the sentiment of
local leaders, as well as evidence that they had gotten resources
from outside the community to accomplish things in the neighbor-
hood. Leaders who described their communities as “abandoned”
or “forgotten” were considered to have low resource attraction
effectiveness. Leaders that were able to describe multiple pub-
lic works or successful community development initiatives were
considered to have high resource attraction effectiveness. Some
leaders could only describe one successful case, and others did not
provide enough information to judge their performance. Those
cases were sorted into the moderate and unknown category.
It is important to note that this assessment judged the leader’s
effectiveness of generating resources from outside of the com-
munity. This assessment leaves out self-generated development,
something that is both more challenging and perhaps more im-
portant for overall well-being in the neighborhood. Motivating
community members in collective action is an important commu-
nity leader role, but should best be explored through a research
design that incorporates the opinions and feedback from commu-
nity members.
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Exploring just community accountability or political accountability alone, as is
common in recent literature on clientelism and brokerage, does not account for
much of the variation in effectiveness of social leaders in the sample.
Of the leaders contacted in the survey, 20 of them scored a “0” on community
accountability, 35 scored a “1” meaning either they were competitively elected in
the past or face a competitive election in the future, and 9 scored a “2” meaning
they experienced both prior and future electoral accountability. Just over half of
the leaders in the survey did not face a competitor in the previous election, under-
scoring the rarity of even minimally competitive selection for local leaders. When
mapped onto effectiveness scores, the variation in community-based accountability
(through elections) explains very little of the variation in effectiveness. The table
below shows that respondents scoring a 0 on community-accountability are fairly
evenly spread across effectiveness scores, whereas a minority of those scoring a 1 or
a 2 on community accountability were scored as effective. Community accountabil-
ity, at least electorally speaking, appears to hurt local leader effectiveness rather
than help it and lacks full explanatory power.
66












5 (25%) 14 (40%) 4 (44%)
Low 8 (40%) 14 (40%) 3 (33%)
On the political accountability scale, 49, or close to 3/4 of those interviewed scored
“0” meaning they had alternative options or did not rely on local politicians or
local government for resources. While this scoring system undoubtedly does not
capture all of the aspects of political accountability, the majority of leaders our
team spoke with did not primarily seek out political or local funds to solve commu-
nity problems. Instead, many attempted to solve problems within the community,
by turning to large corporations, or not to solve them at all. Thirteen of the re-
spondents had access to resources through private companies including FENOCO
and Drummond because of those companies’ state-required social impact funds
and thus did not need to turn to elected officials or the bureaucracies they control
for resources. Only five respondents scored a 1 on this scale, meaning they relied on
resources from politicians or local governments but did not think politicians could
tell how their communities voted. Another 10 respondents scored a 2 because they
relied on politicians or government for resources and believed politicians could tell
how people voted in their communities.
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High 9 (18%) 2 (40%) 5 (50%)
Moderate and
Unknown
20 (41%) 1 (20%) 2 (20%)
Low 20 (41%) 2 (40%) 3 (30%)
A number of those who scored a two on political accountability claimed they
worked frequently with political parties or candidates for office, but many felt
cheated by the process. One leader described it as “filling us with lies”40 and an-
other felt promises from politicians “went the other way, because we are not there
[in the city] and here we can’t take charge [of political candidates]”41 Another
leader had been a candidate for city council in the past, and leveraged that politi-
cal affiliation to great success including acquiring improvements in public lighting
projects, sewage systems, street pavement, a fire station, and a park while also
helping residents register for social welfare payments.42
Political accountability and community accountability alone leave a lot of variation
in resource attraction effectiveness unexplained. Does considering them together
provide any clarity? In the following section, I explore whether this typology in-





navigating bureaucracy, informal access to resources through favor-requesting, and
their effectiveness at bringing resources into their community.
When looking at formal access to resources across the different types, there are no
major differences between the type assigned and the level of formal access. Social-
oriented, autonomous, and patronage-captured leaders were equally split across
the different levels of formal access ranging from leaders who could name differ-
ent social welfare offices to those who felt the city bureaucracy was complex and
inaccessible. Constrained leaders were the only leader type where formal access
through bureaucratic knowledge is more prominent. Only 1 or the 9 constrained
leaders who completed the interview had low ability to access to resources formally
(out of 20 constrained leaders surveyed). Due to the high level of attrition among
transcripts of constrained leaders who completed the survey, drawing generaliza-
tions from this population is difficult.
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Constrained 4 (44%) 1 (11%) 4 (44%)
Patronage-
Captured
2 (40%) 2 (40%) 1 (20%)
Autonomous 4 (31%) 4 (31%) 5 (38%)
Social-
Oriented
12 (35%) 11 (31%) 11 (31%)
The ability for leaders to access resources informally through requesting favors
varies more substantially than formal resource access across types. While con-
strained and social-oriented leaders are roughly equally likely to be able to request
favors as not, patronage-captured and autonomous leaders display opposite trends.
Four out of the 5 patronage-captured leaders that I have interview transcripts for
displayed a high capacity for favor requesting, and often referred to public officials
or politicians by their names rather than titles. This finding is not surprising since
most community leaders who opt to work with political parties do so because they
expect to build long-term relationships with candidates that they can leverage for
community improvements or personal advancement. In contrast, ten out of four-
teen autonomous social leaders reported that they had no one to turn to outside
of the community. Many described relationships as important in asking for things
from city government and felt that they lacked sufficient ties through friendship
or family to ask for help.
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Constrained 3 (33%) 4 (44%) 2 (22%)
Patronage-
Captured
4 (80%) 1 (20%) 0 (0%)
Autonomous 4 (29%) 10 (71%) 0 (00%)
Social-
Oriented
14 (42%) 14 (42%) 5 (15%)
Some leader types were more effective at attracting resources and assistance from
outside the community than others, based on their own self-reported evidence.
Patronage-captured leaders tended to be effective, whereas many autonomous and
social-oriented leaders faced more challenges and described themselves overall as
less effective. Constrained actors were equally split between high and low effec-
tiveness. This result is directly opposite of what I expected. Expectations from
the theory suggested that Autonomous and social-oriented leaders would have the
highest level of effectiveness, but instead are more likely to be ineffective.
Geography could be driving some of these effects since rural areas face difficulty
in accessing state bureaucracy and are sometimes too remote to be included in
campaigns. Of autonomous CAB presidents, 70% are in rural areas. Of the au-
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Constrained 4 (40%) 4 (40%) 2 (20%)
Patronage-
Captured
3 (60%) 1 (20%) 1 (20%)
Autonomous 4 (27%) 7 (47%) 4 (27%)
Social-
Oriented
5 (15%) 13 (38%) 16 (47%)
tonomous leaders in the high effectiveness category, 75% were in urban areas.43
The one patronage-captured leader in the low effectiveness category was located
in a rural area. Since ruralness is not distributed as-if random across the types,
it’s very possible that rural status drove both classification in the typology and
resource attraction effectiveness scores.
Urban leaders had no particular advantage in informal resource access through fa-
vors, but had far greater formal access to bureaucracy. Multiple leaders lamented
their physical distance from the state as a primary reason that their neighborhood
lacked adequate resources. One leader interviewed described how the distance
from their village to the main road – a five hour hike on foot down a path that’s
impassible to motorcycles hampered their efforts to check back in on petitions and
solicitations. They noted that “people in the mayor’s office have an obligation to
4370% of autonomous leaders were located in rural areas; 30% of constrained leaders; 33% of
patronage-captured leaders; 42% of social-oriented leaders
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help us, but I’m not sure if they take our documents or put them in the trash.”44 In
my own research I found that navigating bureaucracy in Colombia required mul-
tiple trips and long wait times between filing paperwork, and having it rejected
for seemingly arbitrary reasons. For my solicitations to be accepted, I often had
to spend days at a time waiting in office lobbies for the right person to be there.
Living in a rural area would have made accessing the bureaucracy in ways that
I did incredibly costly. As one leader describes it, “The only way to speak with
them is to go to [the city] because they never come here. . . I work and so I can’t
be going back and forth to [the city] all of the time.”45
During my field work in Santa Marta, the incumbent mayor attempted to address
some of these rural access issues by holding “equity fairs” in the rural periphery of
the municipality where representatives of city bureaucracy would provide advice
and collect solicitations from local leaders and residents. These fairs undoubtedly
increased access but haven’t addressed the underlying distance between leaders
and the formal state.
Under my original expectations, autonomous leaders would have the longest tenure
in office compared to all other leader types because they faced no competitive pres-
sures from the community and little opportunity for political career advancement.




trend. Autonomous leaders that I interviewed have the shortest average length of
time in office, and the least variation in time – just over 4 years or one full term.
Patronage-captured leaders have the second lowest average length of office-holding
at just over five years, while social-oriented and constrained leaders tend to stay
in office the longest. Constrained leaders ranged from 4 years in office to twenty-
five. The constrained leaders who had been in office for 16, 20, and 25 years don’t
appear to face as many constraints as theorized, but fall in this category because
they were running for reelection in the future but did not yet know if they would
face a challenger.46 Social-oriented leaders also stayed in office longer than ex-
pected, with an average of six years. This and data from other chapters of the
dissertation suggest that leaders may be choosing to retire when they find the job
disheartening or are ineffective at attracting resources rather than facing pressure
from the community to perform.
Measurement and selection issues challenge inferences from this data. First, I was
only able to capture electoral-based community accountability and not more infor-
mal feelings of social pressure from community members that may play a heavier
role on inducing leader to perform well. Decisions to run f or election again, and
whether they face a competitor are also closely tied to performance as those who
are ineffective at generating resources for community projects want to retire and
46I marked these as community accountable since they weren’t able to rule out that they would
face a challenger. In this case, that decision may have been incorrect.
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Figure 2.1: Years in office by leader type
may face more challengers.
While we had a complete list of registered Communal Action Board presidents in
Magdalena, my research team found that many numbers had been changed, and
phone reception varied throughout the department. The sample lacked unregis-
tered communal action boards, which one leader claimed were more common than
registered boards in her community. Those who were not willing to participate in
the second-half of the interview with open-ended questions and or did not have
those responses recorded were disproportionately leaders who were constrained
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and leaders who were autonomous. Half of all constrained survey respondents did
not have interview transcripts, and 65% of autonomous leaders who completed
the survey did not have transcripts. Most of the missing-ness under constrained
and autonomous leaders was due to poor phone reception, which made it difficult
for my research assistants to record the call, but a number of constrained leaders
opted to have my research assistants take notes on their conversation rather than
record their call. Future work with this population should take this selection effect
seriously.
2.6 Conclusion
The typology and results from this paper make the case that scholars of clientelism
should simultaneously consider the top-down and bottom-up forces that constrain
broker behavior. Brokers who are autonomous, social-oriented, constrained, and
patronage-captured are distinct types with different experiences navigating neigh-
borhood development and diverging levels of success. The distribution of these
distinct types across respondents suggest that patronage-captured types are far
less common among communal action board leaders than emphasized in well-cited
literature from other South American contexts.
Some leaders were more effective at accessing resources for their community than
others. Patronage-captured leaders had the highest effectiveness rate, while social-
oriented and autonomous leaders were more likely to be ineffective. This stands in
contrast with my expectation that autonomous and social-oriented leaders would
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perform the best, patronage-captured leaders to have average performance, and
constrained leaders to perform poorly. These results may be due to underlying
conditions or structural factors that affect both the categorization of leaders and
their effectiveness, including location, whether leaders run for reelection, and fac-
tors I did not collect data on like the gender and race of local leaders.
More research should examine the conditions under which variation in leader type
arises. While much of the variation in leader type may be due to individual
leader preferences and decisions, contextual factors like presence next to a railroad
or distance to a polling place may influence the type of leadership in a certain
community. Similarly, individual factors like age, gender, race, or, in Colombia,
exposure to armed actors, could play a role in within-community changes in leader
type. Understanding when certain types of leaders are more common will help
produce identification strategies for causal inference on the impact of leader type
on a variety of things political scientists care about like voter turnout, political
participation, public goods provision, gender equity, and more.
Future work should further explore the role of private companies like banana farms,
coal mines, railroads, and other entities working on public lands in substituting
for the state and empowering local leaders. Part of Colombia’s mandated social
responsibility policy for private companies involves support to communities within
the environmental impact area. Comparing communities inside and outside of the
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economic impact area of these large companies could yield valuable insights on the
role that the presence of private companies plays in the balance of power between
community leaders and politicians.
Another valuable avenue for future research is to explore the community conditions
under each of these typology categories through site visits and interviews with
residents. More in-depth case studies of communities that fall along these category
could reveal important differences in the lived experience of communal life and




Do Elections for Brokers Yield Better
Candidates for Public Office?
3.1 Introduction
Communal action boards (CABs) in Colombia substitute for weak state capacity
and weak political parties by providing a grassroots link between everyday people,
municipal services, and political candidates. The linkages they create are meant to
be credible because of the grassroots nature of the institution, but communal ac-
tion boards are plagued by low support and concern among neighborhood residents
about elite capture despite being composed through certified neighborhood-level
elections. Many interviews I conducted in communities included complaints like
this one: “She takes money from politicians, and gives it to her friends. You know
how things work here. . . That’s why we have these half-built projects. . . When she
calls a meeting these days, nobody comes.”1 In other neighborhoods though, board
presidents actively solicit grassroots insight into the most pressing community is-
sues and address them, usually by taking money from politicians in exchange for
1field notes March 2019
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turnout commitments. In both cases, local leaders are working as political brokers
with the same formal institutional constraints, but completely different develop-
ment outcomes and community relationships. Why do some neighborhood leaders,
performing the same brokerage job, have such different outcomes? I join a growing
field of research investigating how accountability structures within clientelism can
impact development outcomes through constraints on broker behavior and rela-
tionships between potential brokers and political patrons.
Accountability between politicians, brokers, and voters is hierarchical and top-
down in dominant theories of clientelism (Hicken, 2011). Voters as agents are
thought to be accountable to brokers as principals and brokers as agents are
thought to be accountable to politicians as principals. More recent work chal-
lenges the assumption of hierarchical top-down motivations with politicians at the
top and voters at the bottom, instead finding that brokers are often caught between
two informal sources accountability: politicians and voters. The balance between
these two sources of accountability creates trade-offs with implications for com-
munity development, resource distribution, and competitive democratic elections.
In this paper I explore the effect of bottom-up accountability on whether social
leaders engage in political mobilization and the way that leaders acting as brokers
select the candidates they work with.
I conducted semi-structured interviews and surveys asking social leaders about
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their relationship with city government, belief that working with candidates yields
valuable benefits for their communities, and their proclivity to engage in political
mobilization efforts. I also ask these social leaders, many of whom engage in mo-
bilization, to rank their preferences on types of candidate characteristics through
pairwise comparisons. Following previous findings in the literature, I expected
that brokers running for their own reelection would be more responsive to pub-
lic goods offers than their retiring peers. I further explore whether impending
leader elections affects a leader’s permissiveness of undesirable candidate traits
like corruption allegations. Data from interviews with local neighborhood leaders
show a stark difference among social leaders who are and are not seeking reelec-
tion. Interviews show that social leaders believe that bringing public benefits to
their community is key to their survival in leadership, and many view political
mobilization work for candidates as their only viable path to generating the local
improvements the community wants. Both those running for reelection and those
not seeking another term preferred candidates that offered community benefits,
but leaders facing reelection were more likely to work with potentially corrupt
candidates to secure neighborhood improvements. Findings are limited, however,
by using self-reported data on reelection intent and knowledge of a challenger.
A leader’s reelection incentives and those of her challenger are not randomly as-
signed and plausibly related to unmeasured characteristics in this study including
the mobilizing ability of local leaders so findings are exploratory.
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The literature gap in our understanding on delegation between brokers and voters
is only recently beginning to fill. This paper contributes to the literature in three
ways. Preliminary results contribute to a growing literature on voter preferences
for corrupt candidates, while also documenting existing variation in accountabil-
ity structures of brokers through data collection during Colombia’s neighborhood
leader elections. We know that more accountable brokers generate greater ben-
efits for voters (Auerbach, 2016; Gottlieb, 2017; Nathan, 2019). I extend these
recent findings to show that brokers facing reelections value different candidate
characteristics, meaning that broker accountability can substantively change the
make-up of representative institutions, and engage with politics in different ways
than those who do not face reelection. The data also raises new questions about
the role of accountability structures for community social leaders - subjecting local
leaders to formal election processes may perversely incentivize increased political
engagement through clientelism, even if those relationships shift towards fulfilling
neighborhood needs rather than individual payoffs.
3.2 Are Brokers Responsive to Voter Concerns?
Politicians delegate voter mobilization efforts to brokers because they have greater
and more specialized information about voter behavior. Brokers encourage vot-
ers to vote for certain candidates through positive inducements like the provision
of welfare benefits or negative inducements like the threat of removal of benefits
(Mares and Young, 2016b). Voters in this model are thought to be largely reliant
on brokers to receive crucial medicine or public employment such that regardless of
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the type of inducement, particularly poor voters must comply. If they defect, they
could be cut from all future benefits through a grim trigger strategy (Szwarcberg,
2015; Stokes, 2005). Stokes (2005) labels this relationship as “perverse account-
ability” because the threat of coercive punishment in a repeated game makes voters
accountable to brokers rather than the reverse.
While evidence suggests that politicians monitor brokers for their turnout effort
(Larreguy et al., 2014), the ability of brokers to monitor voters is increasingly
contested. Brokers rarely monitor voters, many voters believe that their ballot
is secret, and brokers often lack an intuitive knowledge about voter tendencies,
presenting challenges to the hierarchical model of clientelism. Instead, politicians
employ brokers to distribute goods prior to an election in order to signal candi-
date viability (Muñoz, 2014), imply future transfers (Kramon, 2016) and encourage
peer-to-peer persuasion (Schaffer and Baker, 2015) among others. Voters comply
with these exchanges because they have strong norms of reciprocity (Chang, 2017;
Lawson and Greene, 2014), or they take cues from esteemed brokers on which
candidate would benefit them the most (Baldwin, 2013).
Brokers are reliant on their persuasive influence over a large voting bloc in order
to strike better bargains with politicians, which can induce an informal account-
ability mechanism. Camp finds that brokers who can credibly threaten to transfer
their support behind an opposing candidate can extract a greater cost per vote
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than those who lack this credible threat, and the best brokers are ones who main-
tain community goodwill (2017). An emphasis on generating community goodwill
explains why many brokers engage in “social work” during non-electoral periods in
Argentina (Zarazaga, 2014). Given that brokers are rarely able to monitor behav-
ior inside a voting booth, a positive reputation in the community both heightens
the persuasive power of brokers (such that monitoring is not necessary) and in-
creases the benefits that brokers can extract from politicians through a credible
threat of switching support (Camp, 2017). A broker’s choice of persuasion as
a strategy over extortion and inducement is most likely when the broker was se-
lected through a competitive process rather than a hereditary one (Gottlieb, 2017).
Accountable brokers like locally elected community leaders can be key to increasing
development in communities where they work. While brokers can be altruistically
community-minded (Baldwin, 2013), brokers can also seek rents from their posi-
tion by pocketing a portion of the payment from politicians directed toward voters
(Szwarcberg, 2015). In India, slums where brokers faced competition from other
brokers of the same party had more paved roads, streetlights, medical camps, trash
collection, water access, and sewage connectivity than slums dominated by bro-
kers from different parties (Auerbach, 2016). Brokers who had to compete for their
voter bloc engaged in more social work and developed better political connections
than brokers in communities with less options for representation (Auerbach, 2016).
Nathan finds that local chiefs in northern Ghana who were selected through more
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competitive processes generate greater development advances among a series of
different indicators than chiefs selected with less competition (2019). In Brazil,
brokers are often so reliant on maintaining their voting bloc that they dedicate
their own money to fulfilling voter requests (Nichter and Peress, 2017). These
results point to broker accountability and competition as prime means for voters
to gain benefits even through non-programmatic means by limiting the amount
that a broker can pocket relative to the amount they redistribute.
A growing literature in political science has highlighted that voters can, in some
circumstances, prefer traditionally less desirable candidate traits like corruption
because they believe corrupt candidates are more likely to accomplish things that
will benefit voters. Corruption flourishes in many strong democracies, despite
opportunities during elections to remove corrupt candidates from office and an
electorate that is largely aware of corruption’s pervasiveness. Instead, voters may
be responding to information about corruption in context with their beliefs on
how politics works(Faller, 2015). For instance, Faller (2015) finds that voters in
Uganda perceive the political system to be highly corrupt, and therefore reduce the
benefits from voting for a clean candidates, and potentially increase the benefits
to electing a corrupt candidate that works within a corrupt system. Similarly,
voters sometimes prefer candidates who engage in criminal and corrupt activity
because those candidates are best able to protect and provide for voters in the
context of failing governance institutions like rule of law and state bureaucracy in
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India (Vaishnav, 2017). Extending these findings to social leaders acting as brokers
may suggest that accountable brokers also support corrupt candidates because of
election pressures, not in spite of them.
3.3 Theory
When brokers are community leaders who want to make improvements to their
neighborhood, gain an income, or rise up in a political party, they usually need
to build relationships with candidates for public office, push those candidates to
provide funds and support for projects, and expend time and resources turning out
voters in support of the candidate. This process is costly personally for individual
leaders who then have three choices to recoup the costs:
• bear the cost of building these relationships in expectation of access to a
better neighborhood and social esteem or a future political career,
• pocket a percentage of the funds received for neighborhood development, or
• not engage at all.
Bottom up accountability through community social pressure or formal elections
push community leaders towards engaging with candidates for public office as bro-
kers, and dictate the degree to which they can skim off the top. Community leaders
facing high levels of bottom-up accountability are pushed towards bearing the cost
of the investment in order to keep their leadership positions. Community leaders
facing low bottom-up accountability can engage in mobilization to generate their
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own private goods by pocketing the reward for mobilizing voters, or opt out of
brokerage positions entirely.
Given that a social leader chooses to engage in voter mobilization, bottom-up ac-
countability should push brokers towards bearing the costs rather than pocketing
a percentage of the funds. While some communities are small enough that social
leaders could distribute cash handouts while keeping very little of the investment
for themselves, economies of scale and social esteem likely push leaders towards
generating neighborhood-level improvements like water tanks, parks, or road pave-
ment. Accountability encourages community leaders to act like brokers, but also
encourages the product of brokerage to be more pro-social.
Bottom-up accountability may also play a role in the selection of candidates based
on non-distributive evaluations of candidate quality. Brokers often publicize a
slate of candidates that they endorse prior to elections, and voters may have prior
information on some candidates. If voters have a prior belief that a candidate
that the broker endorsed is a “bad type,” voters could plausibly form a negative
opinion of the broker and wish to replace him or her with a new community leader.
If community leaders believe that voters will evaluate them based on the type of
candidate they choose to work with, leaders facing competitive elections would be
less permissive of undesirable candidate traits like allegations of corruption or a
lack of experience when conducting brokerage work.
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If community leaders believe instead that voters evaluate them based on their abil-
ity to produce public or private goods alone, community leaders facing competitive
elections may be more permissive of these traits in their work as brokers. Voters
in Latin America tend to have poor prior opinions of political actors (Mainwar-
ing, 2006) so it is reasonable to believe that voters lack variation in their prior
evaluations of candidate quality. If voters did have good access to information on
candidate quality, community leaders acting as brokers may still tolerate undesir-
able candidate traits if they believe that public goods provision is more central to
voter evaluation of their performance.
Community leaders are most accountable to voters, at least electorally, when they
face competition for their position. Whether community leaders are elected in
neighborhood contests or selected informally based on their community connec-
tions and reputation, voters are not always able to freely withdraw support from
a broker they believe is performing poorly. If community leaders control access to
vital resources, withdrawing support can have prohibitive economic costs. Further-
more, criminal gangs and armed groups actively back certain grassroots leaders,
and some local leaders in Colombia can throw elections by manipulating voter
rosters which poses a threat to bottom-up accountability. In these cases the trap-
pings of elections would not create sufficient accountability conditions required to
produce behavioral changes in leaders and their subsequent work as brokers.
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This leads to the following testable hypothesis using a survey of community lead-
ers:
Hypothesis 1: Leaders facing bottom-up accountability will be more
likely to mobilize voters.
Hypothesis 2: Leaders facing bottom-up accountability will be more
likely to favor candidates that offer public benefits for the neighborhood
over candidates offering personal benefits.
Hypothesis 3a: Leaders facing bottom-up accountability will be more
permissive of undesirable candidate traits.
Hypothesis 3b: Leaders facing bottom-up accountability will be less
permissive of undesirable candidate traits.
3.4 The Colombian Case
While social leaders in democracies around the world face similar choices whether
to engage in political mobilization and similar principal-agent constraints on their
behavior as brokers, Colombia provides a unique opportunity to see a formalized
version of bottom-up accountability in action since social leaders in Colombia are
formally elected and officially non-partisan neighborhood representatives in a weak
party system reliant on brokerage. Brokers in other contexts are often involved
in grassroots governance activities and rely on the community goodwill generated
through these activities to accomplish brokerage tasks (Zarazaga, 2014), but the
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mechanism by which voters hold brokers accountable in informal settings is less
transparent. Brokers are formally elected in other contexts including councilors in
Argentina (Szwarcberg, 2012) and chiefs of certain ethnic groups in Senegal (Got-
tlieb, 2017) among others so there are numerous cases where brokers would receive
similarly strong cues about their competition from year to year. Colombia also has
substantial variation in broker behavior, ranging from acting as substitutes for the
state to working as a political machine, combined with substantial variation in the
level of bottom-up accountability as measured by leader election competitiveness.
Communal action board (CAB) leadership elections occur the last Sunday of April
every four years.2 The leadership team is made up of a president, vice president,
treasurer, secretary, and a variety of smaller posts including delegates, councilors,
and sub-committee chairs. The neighborhood CAB president is the de-facto leader
and other positions tend not to be involved in brokerage work. Neighborhood elec-
tions in the study’s field site, Santa Marta, are conducted via candidate slates but
in other parts of Colombia, candidates are elected via non-partisan lists using a
quotient rule. Elections for local and state positions are usually held 6 months
prior to the neighborhood leadership elections, so the brokerage choices that CAB
presidents made in the previous election are still fresh in minds of voters at the
time they evaluate CAB president performance.
2The elections this year are postponed indefinitely because of the pandemic.
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Colombia instituted a nation-wide quarantine with very strict rules surrounding
the movement of people in response to COVID-19. The quarantine began on March
24 and only began to ease as of July 2020. Nation-wide quarantines particularly
affect the livelihoods of Colombians who mostly work in informal labor positions
where they cannot take advantage of the social safety net and are unable to work
remotely. In response, national and local governments are instituting cash transfer
programs and food deliveries to vulnerable families who do not qualify for existing
social welfare programs, but needs exceed supplies which has resulted in allega-
tions of preferential disbursement. Communal action board leaders are taking an
active role in advocating for their neighborhood’s needs by documenting the extent
and type of assistance required, but there appear to be few formal mechanisms to
collect this information at the city level.
All public events in Colombia have been canceled and the timeline for submitting
forms in advance of the CAB elections have also shifted in response. The municipal
government of Santa Marta has not yet decided a new date for CAB elections, but
they will be delayed over a year. As such I rely on self-reported interest in running
for reelection rather than actual election results. Reelection intentions are also less
clear during this period than in the past, as many people who would otherwise be
predisposed to run for reelection responded that they felt unsure about running
because there was no official election date. I was also unable to determine whether
others were planning to run against the incumbent as the registration period to
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run for reelection has also expanded.
3.5 Research Design
I use two related sources of data to understand the empirical implications of the
theory: qualitative interviews, a discrete choice experiment conducted before the
pandemic using a sample of social leaders in Colombia, and pairwise comparison
data collected over the phone from a non-random sample of social leaders between
April and May. The structured interviews covered topics including what residents
typical ask of neighborhood leaders, whether the respondent had engaged in voter
mobilization, whether they felt there were benefits from mobilization, and their re-
lationship with the city government. I compare responses to these questions under
different degrees of bottom-up accountability measured through survey responses
on communal action board election status. To understand the preferences that lo-
cal leaders have for candidates that they may work with, I look at discrete choice
and pairwise comparison data on candidate attributes. Unfortunately, my team
was only able to collect a small sample for the discrete choice experiment, which
was far insufficient to infer interaction effects between the items in the experiment
and the level of competition. As such, I present the discrete choice results as a
way to suggest that brokers do indeed have discernible preferences for the kinds of
candidates they work with. The hypothesis related to preferences over candidate
attributes are instead largely tested with pairwise comparison data, and grounded
by an analysis of qualitative interview data.
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Mobilizing voters can be a sensitive issue in Colombia and people have varied un-
derstandings of the concept. Because the topic is complex, I opted to interview
social leaders on their experiences rather than use survey responses. The inter-
view component includes conversations with social leaders over topics including
experiences mobilizing voters, what kinds of benefits mobilizing voters can bring
a neighborhood, and their relationship with city government, which provide addi-
tional background context. I use these interviews to assess whether leaders engaged
in voter mobilization as brokers, and the kinds of benefits they received as a prod-
uct of that mobilization. I expect that more accountable leaders are more likely to
describe receiving public benefits as a result of their brokerage work. Due to the
sensitive nature of receiving cash payments for political work, a very small number
of responses hinted that social leaders were taking individual personal payments
for mobilizing voters despite the true number potentially being far larger. Coding
rules are described below, and the full interview script is included in Appendix B.
I coded mobilization inductively using the following rule to cluster responses:
93
Table 3.1: Interview Questions and Response Coding
Mobilization
Relevant Question Do you help voters get to the polling place on election day
Coding Respondents were largely clustered among three types:
Respondents who emphasized that they did not mobilize
voters or get involved in politics at all, those who saw
mobilizing voters during campaigns as an important role
for CAB leaders, and those that emphasized they would
only advise voters on potential candidates or serve as
a resource. For analysis I grouped these responses into
two categories: those that mobilize (including those who
suggest) and those who isolate themselves from politics.
Mobilization Benefit
Relevant Question In your experience, are there benefits to working with po-
litical candidates?
Coding I separated responses into two categories - those who
could describe a public work that was brought to the
neighborhood as a result of voter mobilization, and those
that could not, either because they denied the presence
of benefits, or the benefit they described was not public
in the sense that only a small number of people would
benefit.
To understand how leaders who engage in brokerage work understand candidate
attributes, I use a discrete choice experiment and pairwise comparison of candi-
date attributes. A discrete choice experiment can provide a wealth of information
about the impact of attributes on how brokers decide among candidates, but due to
the outbreak of COVID-19 world-wide, we were only able to collect 34 responses.
Nevertheless, this experiment allows us to understand how CAB presidents make
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a choice in candidate endorsement. Conjoint experiments mimic real-world multi-
dimensional decisions, like candidate selection, more closely than one-dimensional
survey experiment designs, require less assumptions about the strategies by which
people make decisions (Hainmueller et al., 2014) and have been used in a plethora
of political science research understanding candidate choice. The experimental
set-up is closely related to Mares and Visconti’s 2019 experiment showing how
voters respond to different forms of candidate malfeasance.
In the discrete choice experiment, respondents were shown two candidates that
vary across 6 attributes and asked to choose one candidate from the pair to en-
dorse (a “forced-choice” design). The process was repeated 6 times, meaning that
each respondent saw a total of 12 candidate profiles. Two attributes in the exper-
iment measured the marginal effect of inducement type on candidate endorsement
and another attribute measured broker permissiveness of undesirable candidate
traits. The final three attributes - area support, income, and experience - were
included to increase the face-validity of the experiment for respondents and to
allow some room for avoiding social desirability biases in selection. An example of
the attributes for the discrete-choice experiment are included below:
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Table 3.2: Candidate Attributes
Attribute Values








The candidate has a lot of income? Yes, products of a business they
manage
No
Has the candidate made promises about ben-
efits for this neighborhood?
Has promised to finance a pro-
gram of your choice
None
Has the candidate made any promises about
individual benefits for the president of the
CAB?
Yes, will provide particular bene-
fits
No
Is there an investigation open against the
candidate on questions of political integrity?
None
An investigation was closed due
to lack of evidence
There is an open investigation
Due to concerns about viral transmission during face-to-face interviews, the sur-
vey shifted to administration via phone interviews and we were unable to continue
collecting conjoint experiment responses using that medium. Before the pandemic
reached Colombia, my research assistants and I attended the Secretaŕıa de Go-
bierno training sessions for the upcoming local elections to make contacts with
CAB leaders. We were able to record phone numbers for a large portion of Santa
Marta’s CAB leaders, and utilized a snowball sampling method to make further
contact with local leaders to be included in the sample. While our original plan
was to visit local leaders in person to reduce non-response rates, we were unable
to do that because of pandemic safety protocols.
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In response to mandatory quarantine during the study timeline, health and safety
concerns, and new restrictions on human subjects research, I shifted to collect-
ing data on candidate attribute preferences through pairwise comparisons. The
discrete choice experiment was impractical to enumerate verbally without visual
cues, so I selected the four most theoretically interesting candidate attributes from
the discrete choice experiment and solicited preferences through pairwise compar-
isons. Because of the style of the comparisons, each attribute was altered to be
a conventionally positive characteristic. With four possible attributes, there are 6
unique combinations for comparison, and each pair was shown to the respondent,
though the order within question and between questions was randomized to avoid
bias. The most prominent disadvantages to this method of attribute pairwise com-
parisons are that interactions across different candidate traits are not detectable
and the attributes were limited.
Candidates can offer brokers inducements that preference the broker over other
members of the neighborhood. The discrete choice experiment used two options
for personal inducements: a promise of particular benefits to people who mobi-
lize voters on their behalf, or no personal inducements which I used as a neutral
baseline category. In the pairwise comparison section, I included only a promise of
particular benefits to supporters as a way to simplify the questions for audio-only
enumeration. Candidates often also offer inducements before an election for com-
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munal goods ranging from road pavement to youth groups that would be much
harder for a broker to singularly benefit from. While my exploratory interview
research suggested that road pavements were highly persuasive inducements and
common in low-income neighborhoods, the experimental design required commu-
nal benefits that would be of a similar value across the neighborhoods in my sample
irrespective of pre-existing infrastructure conditions, so I included a generic can-
didate promise to fund a project of the broker’s choosing in their neighborhood
and a baseline of no promises for neighborhood projects. In order to simplify the
survey for the comparisons, I included only a generic candidate promise to fund a
project in their neighborhood.
Political candidates are often imperfect and regularly face allegations of corruption
or other objectionable behaviors. In Colombia, scandalous political attributes gen-
erally fall into one of three categories: electoral fraud, linkages with armed groups
(parapoĺıtica), or corruption in state contracting. Electoral fraud and armed group
linkages are multi-dimensional concepts in Colombia and closely related to other
aspects of the experimental design. Electoral fraud is closely related to brokerage
work, so allegations of engaging in electoral fraud would have been more likely
to influence the marginal effect of the inducement-related attributes rather than
serve as a measurement for permissiveness of undesirable behavior on its own.
Similarly, alleged links with armed groups can signal partisanship, insecurity, and
support for communal institutions. These signals affect the brokers in my sample
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differently based on unobservable characteristics like prior affiliation with armed
groups, previous threats of violence, and orientation in the conflict, so armed group
association would substantially complicate the experiment. In the discrete choice
experiment, I included three variations on the theme of corruption - a candidate
who was under investigation for corruption, a candidate who’s corruption case had
been closed due to lack of evidence and a candidate with no history of corruption
allegations. For the comparisons, I include a simple allegation that the candidate
has a reputation for not being corrupt. The comparison attributes are included
below:
Question: Would you prefer to support a candidate that [a] or [b]?
Characteristics
1) Had a good likelihood of winning
2) Had a reputation for not being corrupt
3) Promised particular benefits to supporters
4) Promised to finance a project in your neighborhood
To measure bottom-up accountability, I focus on electoral accountability for so-
cial leaders. Some leaders face highly competitive elections for re-election while
others run unopposed or opt not to run for reelection at all. The survey was
enumerated two months before the planned Communal Action Board leadership
elections in Santa Marta, Colombia, though the election has been postponed in-
definitely. In Santa Marta, Communal Action Board leadership is elected via a
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complete non-partisan slate (plancha).3 Due to the postponement of the election,
I collected information on whether the community leader reported that he or she
was running in the election or deciding to step down from the position. Close to
half of the respondents in the sample claimed that they were seeking reelection or
potentially seeking reelection, while half said they did not want to seek reelection.
Because of the year-long delay in neighborhood elections due to COVID, and that
this interview was conducted at the very beginning of the pandemic, I assume that
respondents who were unsure of their reelection plans lacked certainty because of
the unusual circumstances and face similar motivation to comply with community
demands as those who had firmer plans.
Of those running for reelection (or unsure of their reelection plans), twelve had
no challenger yet, and fifteen were running against someone else. I combine sur-
vey responses on whether the respondent planned to run for reelection with their
knowledge of challenger to create three accountability categories:
• Respondents not running for reelection are considered to have no account-
ability;
• Respondents running for reelection are considered to have low accountability;
• Respondents running for reelection and facing a challenger are considered to
3Especially small communal action boards, mostly in rural areas, are allowed to request
an election by consensus without formal voting mechanisms, but the municipal director for




Ultimately this measure of bottom-up accountability is imperfect because it leaves
out the informal social mechanisms for accountability that likely play a larger role
in constraining behavior, particularly at the neighborhood level. Living in the
same community and partaking in similar social events in many cases may mo-
tivate leaders to a greater extent than leader elections. As such, the data and
analysis included in this paper can only be interpretted as contributing to our un-
derstanding of the role that electoral accountability plays in a community leader’s
decision to mobilize on behalf of political candidates and how they choose among
candidates to work with.
Leaders themselves make a decision to run, and other residents of the neighborhood
make a choice to run against incumbents, so neither can be thought of as random
or exogenous to the outcomes collected, ultimately undermining any attempt at
causal inference. Instead, the elections studied may serve as a sorting mechanism
between leaders who can and will mobilize voters, and those who can’t or won’t. In
the long-run leaders who enjoy, reluctantly engage in, and are able to do brokerage
work are likely to stay in the position, while those who feel strongly against working
with politicians or lack necessary skills to do so cycle out of office - not because
they were voted out but because they choose not to continue their leadership
roles. The research design itself cannot delineate between leaders who see bottom-
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up accountability as constraining their behavior and leaders who, as a result of
elections, cycle out based on type because they are observationally equivalent
outcomes. I address in the discussion section how future work that may take place
during a more normal neighborhood election cycle could gather more definitive
information on the topic.
3.6 When do social leaders engage in brokerage?
The results from these interviews show immense variation in whether social lead-
ers engage in politics through voter mobilization at all. In response to an inter-
view question about whether respondents help voters get to the polls during local,
territorial, and national elections, leaders were split between those who actively
mobilized residents, those who mobilized voters more passively through suggesting
candidates, and leaders who rejected political brokerage roles. The question was
designed to subtly reference voter mobilization in a socially acceptable fashion,
but nearly all respondents interpreted the question to be related directly to voter
mobilization on behalf of political groups likely because voter mobilization is com-
monly associated with CAB leaders.
I expect that bottom-up accountability through community elections may encour-
age leaders to be involved in brokerage work to generate investments for their
communities rather than opt out of brokerage. The table below shows the break-
down of mobilization activity across three categories of bottom-up accountability.
The first column shows the distribution of voter mobilization across community
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leaders who are not running for reelection. The second column shows mobilization
across leaders who are running for reelection, but are not facing an opponent for
their position. The third column shows leaders who are running for reelection
against a challenger, and therefore face the greatest incentive to perform well.
Table 3.3: Voter Mobilization by Bottom-Up Accountability Level
No Reelection Reelection Reelection Competition
Mobilization 16 (55%) 9 (90%) 9 (82%)
No Mobilization 13 (45%) 1 (10%) 2 (18%)
Leaders not running for reelection are roughly equally likely to work as brokers as
not, but leaders running for reelection, regardless of whether they face a challenger
or not, overwhelmingly mobilize voters through brokerage work. Consistent with
expectations, bottom-up accountability through the form of elections pushes social
leaders into brokerage work, but facing a challenger for their position doesn’t seem
to change behavioral incentives substantially. Just over half of leaders who are not
opting to run again also engaged in brokerage work, so community-based behav-
ioral constraints from elections are not necessary for leaders to opt in to brokerage
work.
The two leaders who did not engage in brokerage work but were facing competitive
reelection contests both still recognized the importance of political mobilization
for their community. One leader in this category worked before elections to make
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sure that residents in her neighborhood were registered to vote at the polling place
closest to the neighborhood.4 Ensuring that all residents are voting in the closest
polling place increases the visibility of the community’s vote bank. In my field
work in Santa Marta multiple leaders mentioned that getting residents to coordi-
nate to vote at one polling place was a difficult task but necessary to demonstrate
their political impact and generate investment in the community. Another leader
described how he “does his political work not necessarily in the neighborhood that
I live in, but always with my family and my group of friends.”5 The one respondent
who was running for reelection with no challenger and reported no mobilization
efforts noted that he and most people in the neighborhood voted the way their
employer told them to because of “labor commitments.”6
Looking just at those who engaged in brokerage work, the majority of communal
action board presidents reported community development benefits from working
with candidates for public office. Leaders who were running for reelection and
those running against an opponent were both slightly more likely to report that
there were benefits from brokerage work. Social leaders who engaged in brokerage,
but were not running for reelection were the most likely to report that there were
no benefits from working with candidates for public office. The difference between





Table 3.4: Benefits from Brokerage Work
No Reelection Reelection Reelection Competition
Benefits 5 (55%) 5 (71%) 3 (60%)
No Benefits 4 (45%) 2 (29%) 2 (40%)
Both of these results could be driven by self-selection. The decision to run for re-
election is likely related to the ability to get things done during their term. Leaders
who don’t engage in politics as brokers, either because they lack the networks and
knowledge or because of a normative stance, are less able to get things done, and
may therefore decide to quit. Having a competitor may also be a product of poor
performance. Leaders generating a lot of positive community development are less
likely to see someone run against them for community leadership than those who
are performing poorly. Given the data limitations, I used whether leaders were
running for reelection and faced a challenger, but leaders who lack a challengers
may not necessarily be less accountable than those who do.
To understand the effect of competitive elections further, I looked at the break-
down of brokerage work on the length of time that leaders had been in office. Of
the respondents, 24 were in their first term, 10 were in their second term, and 14
had been in office for more than two terms. Results similarly showed that those
in office for longer were more prolific vote mobilizers than those in office for just
one term. Taken together, the interview data suggests that leaders in Santa Marta
who mobilize voters stay in office longer for two possible reasons. Either, mobiliz-
ing and non-mobilizing types select into community leadership position, but only
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mobilizing types opt to stay longer. Some interview responses support this inter-
pretation - almost all of the leaders who were adamant that CABs should not be
involved in electoral politics at all elected not to run again. Alternatively, leaders
who face reelection pressures feel required to mobilize voters in order to generate
neighborhood improvements, whereas those who don’t face reelection pressures do
not. All respondents who have been in office for two terms or more and planned
to run for reelection mobilized voters for elections, however this wouldn’t explain
why a substantial number of respondents (12) who were not running for reelection
engaged in voter mobilization anyway.
These trends have potential impact for unequal development. Those who are not
running for reelection disproportionately believe the city government does not care
about their communities and that there are no benefits to mobilizing voters for
electoral politics. While this is likely a selection effect where leaders who believe
they lack power tend to retire, this could still have lasting effects on neighbor-
hoods. Among those that mobilized voters, 13 thought there were benefits to
working with politicians and 8 did not believe they had received any benefits de-
spite their efforts. Only one leader who thought there were benefits to working
with politicians decided not to mobilize voters because “many candidates forget
their promises to those that helped them after they are elected.”7 The rest of the
community presidents who opted to not mobilize voters felt there were no benefits
to electoral mobilization. Most leaders who did not mobilize voters similarly felt
7Interview 5176
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that the city government doesn’t care about them.
In the next section, I explore how accountability impacts the way that leaders
acting as brokers decide what candidates to work with and the way they value
candidate offers and attributes.
3.7 Discrete Choice Experiment and Pairwise Comparison
Survey Results
Because the outcome in a discrete-choice experiment or a pairwise comparison with
two choices is binary, I analyze the results using a logistic regression with dummy
variables for each attribute and interaction effects between the level of competition
and the attributes of interest. Each observation is a candidate profile shown to a
respondent in the experiment, leading to 360 total candidates, which is far short of
the expected 1,800 total candidates in the pre-COVID research design. The coeffi-
cient on each attribute variable represents the average marginal component effect
or the average effect of the attribute on the probability that the candidate is chosen
compared to the baseline neutral level for that attribute (Hainmueller et al., 2014).
These preliminary results show that the community leaders sampled have dis-
cernible preferences for the kinds of candidates they would like to work with,
particularly with regards to corruption allegations of candidates. All else equal,
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candidates without any form of corruption allegation are more likely to be pre-
ferred than those who face allegations of corruption. Those who have been cleared
of corruption allegations are also preferred to those who have an ongoing case
against them. Individual gifts from candidates to community leaders, while com-
mon practice in this part of the country, decreased the likelihood that a candidate
was preferred in the match-up. There are a few possible interpretations for this
result - either respondents were consistent in their preference for non-corrupt can-
didates and saw private goods as an extension of corruption, respondents were
subject to social desirability bias, or a combination of both. The offer to finance
projects in the neighborhood had a positive marginal effect on preference, but
failed to reach standard levels of significance, as did support from other nearby
CABs and a previous electoral victory. The attribute on income was also insignif-
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icant.
Bradley-Terry models test the “abilities” of players in head-to-head match-ups
and are commonly used in creating rankings for sports teams. Because estimates
are based on choices among alternatives, Bradley-Terry models incorporate the
underlying structure of alternatives in the data - choosing a means that b was
not chosen. For an explanation of these models and their application to political
science, see (Zucco et al., 2019). Since only 4 items were included in the paired
comparison data, each subject was given 6 comparisons to decide on composing
all of the possible combinations of the four items, and order both within pairs
and between pairs was randomized. To analyze the data, I counted the number
of times each attribute won in a match up against other attributes, creating a
matrix with 24 rows (one row for each possible match up of comparisons). In
the results table below, the ability estimates of the attributes are set in relation
to neighborhood projects as the reference category. Each attribute (likelihood of
winning, individual gifts, reputation for not being corrupt, and offers of neighbor-
hood projects) with a negative coefficient means they were more likely to lose when
compared with neighborhood projects, while positive coefficients represent that at-
tribute being chosen over neighborhood projects. The results of these comparisons
show that respondents preferred offers of neighborhood projects to any other can-
didate characteristic except for a reputation for not being corrupt, reflecting the
community-development driven nature of communal action boards and a strong
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dislike of corrupt candidates. Likelihood of winning was substantially lower in the
rankings, and, similar to the conjoint results, an offer for individual benefits to the
respondent was the least likely to be chosen compared to neighborhood projects.
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Table 3.5: Pair-wise Comparison Results
Ability Estimates
Relative to a Neighborhood Project offer







Likely to win : Reelection −0.082
(0.202)
Not Corrupt : Reelection −0.282
(0.192)
Individual Gift : Reelection −0.227
(0.208)




Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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I fit the model with an interaction term to capture the effect of accountability
(running for reelection vs. not running again) on the rankings. Each subject was
coded as planning to run for reelection or not. A negative value on the interaction
terms signals a decrease in ability when compared to the reference category of not
running for reelection. While none of the interaction terms meet traditional mea-
sures of significance, the inclusion of the accountability interaction effects shows
an interesting pattern that can be seen in the following preferences chart. The es-
timate for the importance of the non-corrupt characteristic drops when comparing
subjects who do not plan to run for reelection and those who do. Individual gifts
are even less desirable among those running for reelection. Conversely, the impor-
tance of neighborhood benefits increases. Relative to neighborhood benefits, the
importance of partnering with a clean candidate remains higher than other cate-
gories but drops in importance for the subjects who face reelection. Both of these
trends, while not significant, suggest that more accountable community leaders
value community development, but perhaps at the cost of anti-corruption efforts.
The overall number of subjects who we were able to contact by phone (n=63)
is quite small for the expected effect size, so I am unable to draw a definitive
conclusion from the data.
Table 3.6: Candidate Characteristic Rankings by Reelection Status
No Interaction Not Running for Reelection Running for Reelection
1 Not Corrupt Not Corrupt Neighborhood Project
2 Neighborhood Project Neighborhood Project Not Corrupt
3 Likely to Win Likely to Win Likely to Win
4 Individual Gift Individual Gift Individual Gift
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Similar to the conjoint, candidates offering individual gifts were least likely to be
chosen in the pairwise comparison. In fact, only one respondent chose individual
gifts over a neighborhood project, three chose individual gifts over not being cor-
rupt, and three chose this attribute over having a likelihood of winning. There
are three possible interpretations of this rejection for individual gifts - researcher-
related social desirability bias, community-related social desirability, and a belief
that individual gifts are less valuable. Respondents, knowing the enumerators were
students at a local prestigious university and part of a research project being con-
ducted by an American University may have provided answers they thought our
research team would agree with. However, CAB leaders taking individual benefits
from candidates is a widely disparaged practice in the community, not just among
our research team. CAB leaders could be responding to this community percep-
tion by not taking part in these exchanges because they want to maintain their
esteemed standing in the community. Individual gifts could also seem less valu-
able to CAB leaders because of their one-off nature. During interviews with CAB
leaders that informed the research design, one leader told me that he never takes
money from local politicians because then these politicians feel like they don’t
owe his community anything else in the future. Finally, this could be a product
of selection effects. Rather than elections influencing candidate preferences, CAB
leaders who decide to run for reelection could have underlying traits that are less
altruistic and more willing to make deals with unsavory candidates to generate
neighborhood improvement.
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To adjudicate between these competing explanations, I repeated the analysis two
more times with different interaction terms- membership rate and number of terms.
During CAB elections, only officially registered members of the CAB can vote for
leadership. While membership is open to everyone, in practice some neighborhoods
have very few official members relative to the number of neighborhood residents.8
About half of the CAB leaders interviewed claimed that at least half of the neigh-
borhood were members, while the other half of respondents admitted that less than
half of the neighborhood were members. In neighborhoods with relatively small
members compared to the total population, individual gifts may be more prefer-
able to non-excludable neighborhood projects because many residents whose votes
do not count for leader reelection would get to use public goods at the same rate
as voting community members. The interaction term is similarly insignificant, but
in contrast with reelection status, the resulting preferences over candidate charac-
teristics are identical between CAB leaders with high membership rates and those
with low membership rates.
CAB leader preferences for public goods over private goods may also be the re-
sult of experience in office. Leaders who have greater experience may be more
well-informed about the reputational and contractual risks of taking individual
gifts like money from politicians. To approximate the variation in experience,
I separate the responses between leaders who have only been CAB leaders for
8Respondents overwhelmingly blamed a lack of interest by residents for low membership rates
in their communities.
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one mayoral election period, and those who have been leaders for more than one
mayoral election period. Similar to the results from interacting CAB member-
ship rates, there were no discernible differences in preferences of CAB leaders with
previous election experience and those without. Though none of the three models
reach significant levels of confidence on interaction term coefficient estimates, both
of these results suggest an underlying selection effect in running for reelection -
neighborhood leaders that run for reelection are likely those that are willing to put
project offers above other admirable candidate traits like a clean reputation.
3.8 Discussion and Conclusion
Due to difficulties with field research conditions during 2020, there are a number
of challenges to extracting reliable results from this data. First, the small sample
sizes on both the conjoint experiment and the pairwise comparison data mean the
null results are not precise. The original research design involved collecting 250
responses from CAB leaders face-to-face in Santa Marta, which would have been
close to the total number of leaders in the city. We were only able to collect a frac-
tion of this number, and only from the most easily contacted respondents - those
who attended Office of Community Affairs meetings and were willing to leave us
their contact info, or who we could reach out to via snowball sampling. As such,
the biased and small sample size means a second iteration of the study may likely
yield very different results.
Second, the qualitative responses were likely influenced by my presence as a for-
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eign researcher and the extraordinary lock-down conditions during the time of the
study. The research assistants collecting these responses had spent their entire
lives living in Santa Marta, but made clear that they were working on behalf of
an American graduate student. I was introduced to many of these respondents
through the office for communal affairs, which many associated with the current
administration and the power to allocate grants for neighborhood improvements.
The research assistants involved in this study were instructed to make sure leaders
knew we were not able to provide any grants or assistance, but because the survey
asked questions related to community issues, leaders thought we would pass their
needs on to other people (foundations, city government, etc) who might help. Po-
tential lingering misunderstandings also undoubtedly influenced decisions to share
information with our research team. However, my role in the study likely biased
away from finding variation in electoral mobilization effort as vote-buying is a so-
cially undesirable activity and thus responses may have been framed in a more
subtle way. The context of the pandemic also likely influenced answers such that
future research may see different results even by contacting the same sample.
Despite these setbacks, the results indicate that local leaders prefer candidates
offering public benefits for their communities rather than private incentives like
cash handouts. Cash handouts generally lost the pairwise comparison match-ups,
had a negative effect in the conjoint experiment, and were criticized frequently
in the qualitative data. The data also supports, though not significantly, that
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CAB leaders running for reelection are more permissive of undesirable candidate
traits like corruption. Interview responses provided additional context and detail
to explain that result. While the theory I put forth in this paper attributes broker
behavior to the level of accountability they face, measured through upcoming re-
election contests, analysis of the interview responses showed that leaders running
for reelection were equally split as to whether they engaged in voter mobilization
efforts. Those running for reelection or unsure about whether they would run
almost entirely engaged in voter mobilization. Instead, the interviews point to a
type of selection effect - both political and a-political types of leaders enter into
office, but only political leaders opt to remain in these positions.
The results featured here raise new questions for further study. Elections may
induce greater accountability for neighborhood-level leaders, but at the cost of
encouraging them to work with potentially corrupt candidates for office. Future
work can expand on this finding to see how neighborhood residents, who vote for
their neighborhood leadership, evaluate and think about that trade-off. While
personal preference likely plays a role, future work could explore whether struc-
tural features of neighborhoods prevent some neighborhood leaders from getting a
good deal when trying to engage in broker work and thus lose interest in electoral
politics. More generally, questions remain over why so many local leaders quit
after just one term.
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Another avenue for future study, specifically with communal action board leaders,
is how neighborhood residents exert their influence over leadership. The original
research design for this study involved a plan for detailed observation of neigh-
borhood elections, but I was unable to do so because of pandemic-related election
delays. Future work could interview voters and non-voters in those elections about
their decision to participate, how they evaluated current leadership and any oppos-
ing candidates, and where they got their information on leader performance from.
A careful examination of leader elections would provide greater detail about the
variation in accountability that leaders face - far more than simply whether they
were running for reelection or not. Finally, qualitative interview data revealed a
far greater role for the private sector in funding local projects than I had expected
to see. A study explicitly designed to uncover the role of private sector funding
for community development could show an interesting dynamic where local busi-
nesses substitute for the work clientelistic politicians usually engage in, which may
explain why some local leaders opted out of electoral politics.
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CHAPTER IV
The Impact of Brokerage Density on Signaling
Support at the Polls
4.1 Introduction
Because they lack grassroots-level engagement, politicians in a wide range of coun-
tries often contract with local brokers - people with connections and status in a
community who promise to mobilize voters on behalf of politicians. Mobilizing vot-
ers through brokers can be an incredibly costly, but vital part of campaign strategy
that comes with a substantial risk of moral hazard (Stokes et al., 2013; Larreguy
et al., 2016; Camp, 2017). Local brokers’ interests are not always aligned with
the candidate’s, and most countries employ a secret ballot, so brokers can collect
payments for their work while expending minimal effort and resources mobilizing
voters. Because of the risk of moral hazard, the ability for candidates to moni-
tor the performance of brokers in the aggregate at polling stations is useful when
campaigns decide how to allocate their resources to mobilization strategies, pre-
ferring to buy turnout in more easily-monitored parts of a district where the risks
of moral hazard are lower (Rueda, 2017; Larreguy et al., 2016). When clientelism
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and patronage influence the distribution of resources, uneven broker monitorabil-
ity can generate spatial development disparities that affect local livelihoods and
removes agency from communities in hard to monitor polling station areas. De-
spite monitorability’s theoretical and practical importance in determining patterns
of distributional politics, studies largely rely on only one potentially flawed mea-
sure of broker monitorability: polling station size. This paper addresses the field’s
under-specification of broker monitoring by expanding measures of electoral geog-
raphy to include the distribution of polling stations and brokers across geographic
space.
The geographical component of campaign strategy dictates how easy it is for can-
didates to infer a broker’s effort based on aggregate polling station outcomes, but
previous work largely measures monitorability by the size and number of polling
stations (Rueda, 2017; Larreguy et al., 2016). Small polling stations allow brokers
to monitor voters (Rueda, 2017) and political campaigns to monitor broker perfor-
mance (Larreguy et al., 2016) because the aggregation is low enough that someone
looking at the results can attribute small inconsistencies - for instance a candidate
expecting to see 15 votes only gets 10- to broker effort rather than random noise.
However we know that the distribution of brokers throughout a population varies
substantially and that more dense concentrations of slum leaders resulted in sub-
stantial improvements in infrastructure through bottom up pressure for leaders to
perform (Auerbach, 2016). Polling stations also vary in their concentration of bro-
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kers with more homogeneous polling stations generating greater vote-share for the
vote-buying incumbent party in Liberia (Bowles et al., 2020). This paper expands
on the literature documenting the uneven spread of brokers across space to demon-
strate that dense brokerage networks do not always prohibit political mobilization.
Studies that only consider polling station size are limited because electoral geogra-
phy has two components: polling station distribution and broker distribution, both
relative to the number of candidates on the ballot. The distribution of polling sta-
tions across districts is a proven element of monitoring and convenient to study in
most scenarios because it is easily quantifiable and fits well with regression discon-
tinuity designs due to the cut-offs frequently used in creating new polling stations
within precincts. However, equating monitoring capacity with polling station size
glosses over potential variation that can be just as important in determining the
degree of moral hazard involved in contracting with local brokers. Imagine three
polling stations each with 100 voters. In one of the polling stations, 50 of the
voters decide for themselves who to vote for, and the other 50 are mobilized by
one local broker to vote for a certain candidate. In the second polling station, 50
of the voters still decide for themselves who to vote for, and the other 50 are split
among 5 brokers who mobilize 10 voters each for the same candidate. In the third
polling station, 50 voters decide for themselves, 5 brokers mobilize ten voters each
for different candidates. When results are tallied on election day, attributing the
final vote count to the broker responsible for it is much easier in the first case
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than the second, despite having the same number of voters in each polling station
because any vote count below 50 can be attributed to one broker’s failure. The
third case is easier to ascertain than the second because candidates still see small
aggregate numbers. While polling station size changes monitorability on the mar-
gins and thus is ideal for causally testing the impact of monitorability on campaign
behavior, size alone is too coarse to use as a reliable measurement in other con-
texts. Rather, by considering distribution of brokers per polling station in concert
with variation on polling station geography and candidates on the ballot, we can
uncover new insights into the effect of brokerage and polling station spatial density
on voter mobilization efforts by campaigns.
Colombia’s electoral system and formalized structure of neighborhood associations
make the ideal case to demonstrate the importance of uneven broker geography in
determining the clarity of broker effort in aggregate polling station results on elec-
tion day. Colombia has a weak party system and open-list proportional electoral
rules so it’s common that a large number of different candidates for the legislature
or city council receive votes at the same polling station, and very few candidates
have a sufficient nation-wide presence to win votes at most polling stations. Even
voters from the same ideological background face hundreds of potential senate
candidates for whom they can cast their vote, giving out-sized importance to local
vote mobilizers who can coordinate the votes from one neighborhood around a sin-
gle candidate. When nationally unpopular candidates win substantial numbers of
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votes at only a few polling places, it’s likely that local brokers mobilized supporters
to vote for that candidate. In Colombia, governance collectives called Juntas de
Acción Comunal, CABs or Communal Action Boards (CAB) in English, work as
both communal leaders and neighborhood brokers. Every neighborhood can have
a CAB, and the local government keeps a record of all CABs in the municipality,
as well as their self-defined borders. CABs are the ideal case to illuminate and
test this theory because they are formalized and geographic-based, which means
local municipal offices keep maps that show the distribution of CABs across mu-
nicipalities. Despite official regulations forbidding CAB leaders from engaging in
electoral politics, local CAB leaders actively turn out votes for candidates in their
“personal capacity” and, as one campaign operative put it, are “indispensable” in
mobilizing voters.1
I create an original measure of polling station mobilization monitorability using
the spatial geography of polling station and CAB leadership offices across Bogotá.
Because polling stations vary in their distribution across the city, and neighbor-
hood CABs vary in size, brokers working out of specific neighborhoods face varying
levels of monitorability at the polling station level. To capture this variation I com-
bine spatial information on each polling station’s neighborhood composition with
GIS coordinates for CAB meeting rooms and membership rosters in Colombia’s
capital. I use the number of CABs to approximate for the number of brokers
working in a polling station vicinity, a number that likely under-counts the true
1Field Notes, October 2019
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number of brokers in a community. High density polling stations are both large
and small with little relation between density and size. Using data on vote choice
at the polling station level, I test the relationship between the number of brokers
assigned to a polling place and the distribution of the vote across candidates at
that polling place.
I find that the density of brokers to polling places has an effect on both the num-
ber and type of candidates winning votes at each polling station. Adding two
additional brokers per polling place adds the equivalent of 1 additional candidate
actively competing at the polling place, and decreases the vote share of party lead-
ers compared to lower-listed party candidates by 1%. The results are robust to
alternative specifications and potentially under-count the true effect size. While
the measurement strategy only accounts for one type of formally registered com-
munal organization, there are likely a greater number of brokers working out of
the vicinity of a single polling station through other forms of collective organizing.
In contrast with previous literature that expects brokers facing competition within
communities to shirk due to monitoring problems, I show that less monitorable dis-
tricts have greater diversity in the candidates receiving votes and are areas where
candidates with high name recognition get less votes. This result suggests that
brokers respond to competition from other brokers not by shirking, but possibly
by diversifying themselves from other brokers to lessen monitoring problems while
still mobilizing large numbers of voters. Qualitative interviews from communal
124
action board leaders in Colombia support this inference.
While I use the case of Colombia to test the theory, the importance of accounting
for uneven density of brokerage over space applies to other cases where vote buying
occurs through geographically constrained brokers. Not all brokers represent geo-
graphic communities of voters, and not all community leaders engage in political
patronage work. In cases where brokers more commonly represent trade groups,
businesses, religious associations, or disparate ethnic groups, monitoring brokers at
the aggregate level using polling station vote tallies is more challenging, regardless
of the size of polling stations or density of brokerage networks. The measurement
strategy for broker effort also relies on Colombia’s open list proportional electoral
system that allows me to distinguish the degree of mobilization by comparing vote
shares for party leaders with high name recognition with more obscure candidates.
In a two-party system with less intra-party competition, however, broker density
affects monitorability concerns to an even greater extent because polling stations
with more than two brokers mean that multiple brokers are mobilizing for the same
candidate such that aggregate results are not attributable to a specific broker.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, I present a novel
way of thinking about broker monitorability. Previous studies emphasized the size
of polling stations, which is an appealing approach because researchers can easily
quantify it and marginal changes in size do have an effect on monitorability, all
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other things equal. But polling station size is a limited notion of monitorability
because it leaves out the number of brokers mobilizing voters in a polling station,
which is largely independent of size and is ill-suited for explaining broker and can-
didate behavior in a multiparty open-list electoral system. In contrast, I present a
new measure of broker monitorability by quantifying the number of unique brokers
working in a polling station compared to the number of candidates on the ballot.
This measurement combined with open-list proportional electoral rules raises the
possibility that politicians can successfully monitor turnout in larger polling sta-
tions, and might be unable to monitor turnout in small polling stations, contrary
to expectations from existing theories.
Second, I expand on previous work by Adam Auerbach and Bowles et al. who
show that the uneven distribution of political brokers through space affects pat-
terns of political mobilization in the developing world. Neighborhoods where more
than one broker mobilizes votes have higher levels of development because brokers
have to work hard to keep their vote base from defecting to other brokers (Auer-
bach, 2016). Polling stations with larger numbers of brokers in contrast have lower
rates of voter mobilization in Liberia because political campaigns find it difficult to
monitor broker performance which increases risks of moral hazard (Bowles et al.,
2020). My work builds on these advances by examining the impact of spatially
uneven brokerage networks on the relationship between brokers and the politicians
that they contract with. We might expect brokers to be highly motivated to de-
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velop a secure voter base in neighborhoods with many other competing brokers,
but, as previous work suggests, politicians may be unwilling to spend large sums
in neighborhoods where they cannot track individual broker performance.
Third, this paper raises new questions about how brokers and candidates can re-
spond to monitoring problems associated with poor electoral geography. While the
placement and size of polling stations is largely out of the control of candidates
and brokers,2 brokers can respond to an oversupply of brokers in a polling place
by diversifying the candidates they work with. When a collective of neighborhood
brokers negotiate the exchange of resources for mobilization work, they might be
able to negotiate higher value returns like public goods, but the moral hazard risks
associated with multiple brokers mobilizing for the same candidate at one polling
station create barriers to collective action. Huge numbers of voters live in areas
with larger than average polling stations and dense broker networks, so under-
standing how those communities can collectively exchange support for patronage
goods in less than ideal monitoring conditions is key to understanding patronage-
based resource distribution.
2One leader I interviewed during my fieldwork did suggest that she pushed for a polling station
in her neighborhood in order to improve their neighborhood’s political visibility, but this is fairly
unusual.
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4.2 Neighborhood Leaders as Brokers
Leaders of local organizations are often co-opted into clientelist brokerage positions
where they leverage their community knowledge and influence to gather votes for
political parties in exchange for positions of greater prestige or stability in the
municipal government, rents from local development projects, or simply better
public services for their communities (Novaes, 2018; Holland and Palmer-Rubin,
2015; Paller, 2014; Baldwin, 2013; Koter, 2013). Brokers traditionally play an in-
termediary role between politicians and voters through recruiting voters to turn
out in support of politicians in exchange for individual or collective goods ranging
from cash handouts to diverted local development spending. Existing theories of
broker behavior focus on the role they play in connecting voters to candidates
by collecting information about voters, making strategic distribution choices, and
monitoring voter behavior (Stokes et al., 2013) and are crucial to a party’s mo-
bilization strategy because weak and new parties lack direct linkages to voters
(Bowles et al., 2020).
The term “broker” encompasses all manner of individuals who connect voters with
candidates. Clientelistic brokers mobilize voters on behalf of candidates or parties
in return for personal or collective rewards. Individual brokers can remain loyal to
a party or act as independent agents who can continually renegotiate mobilization
contracts with different parties and politicians from year to year (Holland and
Palmer-Rubin, 2015). Some brokers are embedded in organizations like unions
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or religious leaders, while others develop a following without relying on organi-
zational structure (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015). Other brokers are part
of public administration, and so performing their daily work while framing their
actions as personal favors can greatly increase their capacity to mobilize support-
ers (Oliveros, 2016). Geographically based brokers who represent a specific area,
neighborhood, or village are the most likely to see their votes concentrated at one
polling place rather than brokers working in organizations that are spread across
the city, but all clientelistic brokers must come up with ways to display the size of
their voting bloc in order to negotiate mobilization contracts with candidates.
The relationship between clientelistic brokers and the politicians that hire them
suffers from a moral hazard problem - brokers are hired because they are believed
to have better information about local voters, but are likely to both overstate the
number of voters they can mobilize and the value of their labor in mobilization
because parties have insufficient information to monitor the broker’s actions. A
broker’s value in negotiations with politicians is based on the number of follow-
ers they can credibly claim to have influence over (Camp, 2017; Auerbach, 2016;
Paller, 2014), muddled by politician’s poor information about the proclivity of
these voters to support a candidate in the absence of broker effort (Stokes et al.,
2013). Politicians value brokers that can reliably turn out high numbers of voters
who would not otherwise cast their ballots in support of the party, but often are
unable to monitor whether a broker has actually fulfilled his or her vote quota, so
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brokers can over promise turnout while shirking in their mobilization efforts. One
way to overcome this problem is through bonuses if the party or candidate wins
(Stokes, 2005; Camp et al., 2014), but this is often insufficient because brokers gain
their own private utility from shirking by building a bloc of core voters rather than
the intended swing voters (Camp, 2017). Another way that politicians overcome
moral hazard risks with hiring brokers is through contracting with brokers who
have direct upward ties to party elites, rather than those who have more informa-
tion about voters (Brierley and Nathan, 2019), which suggests that concerns about
moral hazard are more prominent than concerns over mobilization effectiveness.
Electoral geography can shift the ability of politicians to monitor broker perfor-
mance which affects broker-politician accountability. Politicians commonly use
polling station or precinct-level data on turnout and vote-choice to infer the con-
tributions of individual brokers, but the signal generated from unit-level totals
decreases in precision as the size of the polling station increases (Rueda, 2017;
Larreguy et al., 2016). Turnout is higher in smaller Mexican polling places, and
the turnout increase is associated with increasing vote-share for the PRI, likely
attributable to their prominent party machinery. Because smaller polling places
send a clearer signal of broker effort, broker’s exert more effort to comply with
their turnout commitments (Larreguy et al., 2016). As a result, political parties
deploy more resources in areas where those brokers can be monitored.
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Other literature challenges this notion that brokers are deployed strategically to
certain areas and instead demonstrates the distributive impact of uneven distribu-
tion of brokers throughout space. When multiple brokers from the same party are
working within one neighborhood, Auerbach finds that the competition between
brokers from the same party creates a form of accountability that drives positive
development outcomes for the neighborhood (2016). Conversely, when slums have
only one party worker per neighborhood and therefore no competition, or party
workers from opposing parties, slums tend to have lower levels of development.
The density of broker networks across physical space is key to understanding pa-
tronage politics in India’s slums.
The uneven distribution of brokers across polling stations affects electoral mobi-
lization as well. When polling places in Liberia are largely composed of voters from
the same village, and presumably the same broker, vote tallies at these homoge-
neous polling station are more easily attributed to broker effort. In comparison,
where polling stations have voters from multiple villages, campaigns face a chal-
lenge in attributing vote tallies to the brokers who mobilized each village. More
homogeneous polling stations show a greater vote-share for the incumbent party
in Liberia, thought to be the only party with the resources to use hierarchical
brokerage networks to mobilize voters (Bowles et al., 2020).
Recent advances in understanding how candidates monitor broker performance
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have considered both the size of the polling place and the make-up of voters, but the
concept that large or heterogeneous polling places are inherently less monitorable
isn’t applicable in systems where more than one party or one candidate can use
patronage to reward vote mobilizers.
4.3 Theory
The clarity with which politicians can attribute votes at polling places to individ-
ual brokers remains an important variable in the relationship between politicians
and brokers. While previous work operationalizes monitoring capacity as the num-
ber of registered voters in a polling place, I present an alternative measure for the
concept and caution against using polling station size alone as an indicator of mon-
itorability. Inferences about broker performance from polling stations require an
understanding of how many brokers are mobilizing voters in that space relative to
the number of candidates winning votes, a number that is not evenly distributed
across polling stations and not necessarily correlated with polling station size.
The distribution of a candidate’s brokers across polling places affects the clarity
of polling station level results as an indicator of mobilization effectiveness. Imag-
ine a candidate for Senate contracted with 15 different neighborhood brokers in
a city. If those brokers all worked in different neighborhoods that voted in sepa-
rate unique polling places, the candidate’s campaign team could easily attribute
under-performance at a polling station to one specific broker. By contrast, if all 15
brokers work out of the same polling place and one broker decides to not mobilize
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any voters, it’s nearly impossible for the candidate to attribute those missing votes
to a specific broker.
The number of candidates on the ballot creates a threshold for monitoring chal-
lenges because lower numbers of candidates increase the likelihood that two or
more brokers at one polling place are working with the same candidate. The more
brokers working for the same candidate at the same polling place, the more diffi-
cult it is to attribute blame for poor performance. In an election where only two
serious contenders are on the ballot, the number of brokers exceeding the number
of candidates is oftentimes related to the size of the polling place, which means
that polling station size is a good indicator of broker monitorability. When only
one party can afford to mobilize voters, as is common in new democracies, the
threshold is even lower. The greater the number of vote-buying candidates, the
less important the size of the polling place is to broker monitorability as long as
candidates only contract with one broker per polling place.
The table below summarizes the argument for any number of brokers and can-
didates competing at the polling station. The columns represent the number of
candidates expecting to win votes through contracts with brokers at the polling
place, and the rows represent the number of brokers mobilizing voters at the polling
place. No matter the number of candidates, when only one broker is mobilizing
voters at a polling place, polling station level results accurately depict their effort,
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plus some unknown but constant error (for instance, confused voters casting bal-
lots mistakenly for a different candidate). Any shirking by the broker will be easily
attributable to her when results are tallied. This is reflected in the table with ze-
ros across row one, meaning that there is minimal risk of moral hazard. When
only one candidate is mobilizing voters through brokerage networks at the polling
place, as was true in Liberia where Bowles et al. set their study, the greater the
number of brokers, the larger the degree of moral hazard involved in the contract
between broker and candidate. Looking down column 1 of the table, the degree of
moral hazard increases from 0 to one less than the number of brokers. Similarly,
in a context where only two of the parties engage in voter mobilization through
vote-buying polling stations where there are more than two brokers suffer from an
increasingly large degree of moral hazard as the number of brokers increases. This
expectation holds only if brokers work for different candidates.
Number of Candidates










rs 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0* 0* 0* 0* 0*
3 2 1 0* 0* 0* 0*
4 3 2 1 0* 0* 0*
5 4 3 2 1 0* 0*
N N-1 N-2 N-3 N-4 N-5 0*
Table 4.1: Degree of Moral Hazard by Number of Candidates and Number of
Brokers
*indicates condition if candidates only work with one broker per polling place
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In contrast with previous literature based on two-party elections, an electoral sys-
tem where large numbers of candidates are on the ballot could see greater effort
from brokers working in large, crowded polling stations rather than less. In polling
stations where many brokers are mobilizing voters, candidates can still closely mon-
itor broker performance so long as a candidate only works with one broker in the
polling place, which should limit shirking on behalf of brokers. When candidates
can only choose one partner among a large number of brokers at one polling place,
competition between brokers combined with effective monitoring should generate
higher levels of mobilization overall.
Considering the density of brokers within polling places leads to observable implica-
tions for the level of moral hazard in broker-candidate contracts. When comparing
polling stations of similar sizes for multi-seat elections, the polling stations that
serve a larger number of neighborhood brokers should see a greater diversity in the
candidates winning votes there, particularly among those candidates most likely
to use brokers to mobilize voters. Polling stations with more brokers should see
greater diversity in candidates winning votes because candidates are unlikely to
work with multiple brokers in the same polling place. Rather than shirking, bro-
kers in dense polling stations should be motivated to engage in voter mobilization
campaigns for “clientelist” candidates or those that need to work with local bro-
kers to connect with voters. When only two candidates are on the ballot, polling
stations with larger numbers of surrounding neighborhoods should see lower over-
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all voter mobilization effort either because candidates avoid striking contracts in
those areas or because brokers respond to poor monitoring conditions by under-
performing regardless of the size of the polling place. Polling stations where large
number of brokers are mobilizing voters are not necessarily large polling stations.
4.4 Geographically-Concentrated Neighborhood Associa-
tion Leaders are Colombia’s Political Brokers
Communal Action Boards, or CABs, play a key brokerage role in many Colombian
communities. Because Colombia has a weak party system and conducts nation-
wide elections using open-list proportional representation, many voters turn to
community leaders to identify who they should support. Sometimes this is in the
form of a direct exchange of votes for goods and services individually, but other
times in exchange for more collective benefits. Some voters simply need guid-
ance on policy positions of candidates. CAB leaders who are hoping to generate
neighborhood level improvements, cash they can hand out to individuals, or local
prestige that they can use for policy influence all require a clear way of demon-
strating the amount of votes they can mobilize.
While every group of 70 people or more can form a CAB in their neighborhood,
CABs tend to be the most active in lower-income and informal neighborhoods
where the need for self-governance and government intervention is the most acute.
Wealthier neighborhoods often substitute CABs with condo associations or other
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forms of collective organizing, and while these groups can be quite active in raising
funds for local improvements, they are far less likely to engage in electoral politics.
CABs also range in size, from the minimum 70 members to representing thousands
of households over wide swathes of territory. The average communal action board
in Bogotá has 200 members. Neighborhoods in Colombia are a strong source of
identity for residents, which larger communal action boards leverage to prevent en-
trepreneurial broker-hopefuls from seceding to form a new neighborhood. Squatter
settlements in particular are likely to form communal action boards as their first
act in gaining formal land tenure, and in Colombia these settlements are common
in the hills surrounding more wealthy neighborhoods. Because of this trend, it’s
not uncommon to see one political action board that occupies a small amount of
territory surrounded by wealthier neighborhoods that lack boards. The density of
brokerage networks across space in Bogotá is immensely varied because of local
patterns in wealth and neighborhood size.
While communal action board presidents often have day-jobs, the most lucrative
part of their unpaid position as neighborhood leader is political brokerage. In
addition to direct monetary benefits of working as a broker, CAB presidents often
point to their political relationships as one of the few opportunities they have to
make good on their personal campaign promises of community development. For
example, Rodolfo, the president of an informal peripheral neighborhood in Santa
Marta, described his political brokerage negotiation to me as a process of creating
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indebtedness. Taking money or gifts from politicians before an election removes
any leverage he might have when politicians are in office, so the timing of his re-
quests and the amount he can negotiate for is related to the power of a politician
in office versus as a candidate outside of office. Political candidates for municipal
office can offer him a better deal for his neighborhood after they become members
of the city council if he waits to cash in his reward, although there is some degree
of uncertainty around whether they might win and whether the politician will fol-
low through on the agreement once in office. Senate candidates, in contrast, have
much less direct input in municipal affairs, greater uncertainty about their election,
and substantial resources outside of government, so upfront payment is preferable.3
CAB leaders in Colombia also follow different strategies when working with po-
litical candidates depending on the type of election. Following local elections in
October of 2019, I visited Luis, the leader of a communal action board in a periph-
eral urban neighborhood who was celebrating with a city councilman that he had
helped elect and two members of the councilman’s campaign staff. Luis boasted
that every candidate he worked with was successfully elected to public office in the
election, but when I challenged his assertion by pointing out that his candidate
for governor and mayor lost in a landslide, he claimed elections for those positions
don’t count. He had never formed a relationship with the campaigns for those
candidates, despite having their names painted in 12 inch font across the front of
his house. He commented that, “when choosing the mayor, people mobilize them-
3Field notes: March 2019
138
selves, but for state assembly and city council, one mobilizes by bringing vehicles,
transport and everything to turn the community out.”4 Many neighborhood as-
sociation leaders I spoke with pointed to national and local legislature elections,
rather mayoral and governor seats as the area where they can negotiate the largest
levels of support.5 The theory in this paper suggests that the poor ability for may-
oral campaigns to identify and attribute votes to specific brokers led to a limited
role for neighborhood-based brokers role in their campaigns because the elections
were single-seat, meaning only a few candidates ran. Multi-seat elections using
proportional representation, like those for Senate in Colombia, would be easier to
monitor.
Some CAB leaders do actively mobilize for single-seat elections, but follow a differ-
ent strategy. Like Luis, Diana is the leader of a peripheral invasion neighborhood
under the process of formalizing titles to the land they occupied. When I met
her, she was a public sector employee at the city level and an active member of
the incumbent mayor’s growing political party. Like Luis, she had large banners
hanging in front of her house with the names of candidates for governor and mayor,
including life-size cut-outs, but unlike Luis she credits her work with the Mayor
and Governor as key to her community’s recent development improvement includ-
ing legalization and a water cistern. She had successfully lobbied to add a polling
station to a nearby neighborhood, and regularly met with four of the six other
4Interview 8820
5Field notes: October 2019
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neighborhood leaders who would use that polling place, all of whom supported the
same slate of candidates in exchange for club goods for the neighborhood.6 Her
long-running relationship with the mayor’s political party in the area meant she
was a trusted broker for the mayor’s campaign and would have helped them to
overcome disadvantages associated with contracts over single-seat elections. She
works closely with the three other CAB presidents surrounding the polling sta-
tion in support of the same mayoral candidate’s team, but when I interviewed one
of the other leaders working with her, Rosa, she lamented their inability to act
collectively to support city council candidates. Rosa explained that for mayoral
and governor candidates, the group of CAB presidents were able to keep a list
of the exact table in the polling place that people in their community who had
committed to vote for the governor and mayor were registered to vote at. For
city councilors and assembly-persons, however, “they were really divided,” Rosa
claimed, “because lots of candidates run for city council, so what happens? Peo-
ple were motivated by their personal interests and we became divided.”7 In many
other communities, neighboring community leaders may want to coordinate their
support for certain candidates in return for higher rewards, but campaigns are un-
able to differentiate effort at polling stations or easily disaggregate rewards to those
who complied with the contract, and therefore appear to have an incentive to shirk.
Colombia has a weak party system due to decentralization reforms in the 1990’s
6Field notes: October 2019
7Interview 4829
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and the open list version of proportional representation used to seat the legislature.
Lower house seats are apportioned by departments (Colombia’s sub-national unit)
that then use open list proportional representation to fill the apportioned seats,
but upper-house Senate candidates compete nationwide. Legislative candidates
frequently campaign for their own number on the list rather than the party as a
whole, and party labels are largely devoid of meaning due to frequent movement
realignment where parties team up in sometimes conflicting pairings to yield a com-
plete list of candidates. Because lower-ranked candidates on the party list cannot
personally rely on national political party infrastructure to generate votes, they
must form connections with voters themselves. CAB leaders working as brokers
facilitate this for senate candidates. Since Senators depend on grassroots actors
for their votes, they often cannot mount national campaigns and instead focus
their efforts in select regions and municipalities. Some candidates have national
name recognition, like former Colombian president Álvaro Uribe, or sit at the top
of the party ticket, so they rely less on brokers and receive votes nation-wide. The
geographically uneven nature of votes for senate candidates can be seen in polling
station level results which form the basis of my research design.
4.5 Research Design
The city of Bogotá has 642 polling places8 that serve 5.5 million eligible voters or
around 16% of the country’s overall electoral census making it a major player in
national electoral campaigns. Only 36% of eligible Bogotanos turn out to vote in
8This number include the jails and Colombians voting in consulates abroad
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legislative elections (Misión de Observación Electoral, 2018) so turnout is key to
any electoral strategy. The largest polling place in the city had over 25,000 votes in
the Senate election9 and the smallest polling place recorded 71 votes. In addition
to the uneven distribution of voters to polling stations, there is also immensely
uneven distribution of communal action boards within polling station areas. I use
spatial coordinates of both polling stations and the city’s 814 Salones Comunales
or Communal Action board meeting rooms combined with vote tallies for each
of the 2018 candidates for Senate to measure the variation in brokerage network
density and voter mobilization across the city’s polling places.
By comparing the spatial distribution of meeting rooms to polling stations, I can
approximate the number of brokers mobilizing voters per polling station. For each
polling place, I create a Voronoi tessellation such that every point within the poly-
gon is closest to that polling station, and every point outside the polygon is closest
to other polling stations. The complete tessellation approximates, though imper-
fectly, voter assignment to polling stations. Using the tessellations, I counted the
number of communal action board meeting rooms per polling station area. Figure
4.1 depicts the map of polling place Voronoi tessellations across the urban center
of Bogotá and the density of communal action boards per polling place.
9This number excludes the electoral census post where residents who were not otherwise
assigned a polling place can come to vote. 53,474 votes were cast for the 2018 senate election at
that polling place.
142
Figure 4.1: Density of Communal Action Boards by Polling Station Vicinity
I use results from the 2018 Senate race in Bogotá. Senate seats are filled through
open-list proportional representation from a nation-wide contest, meaning Senate
candidates can get the votes they need to secure a seat in the Senate from just a
handful of polling places anywhere in the entire country. In this particular election,
the most popular party running received just over 16% of the vote while multiple
smaller parties won between 3 and 8%. In this particular Senate election, the
lowest number of votes needed to win a Senate seat was just over 14,00010, while
the average seated Senator received around 94,000 votes.
I measure the number of unique candidates winning votes at a particular polling
station by using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of candidate shares of the
votes cast at the polling place. The HHI can calculate the number of candidates
who won votes at the polling station, weighted by the size of their vote shares.
10This number does not include the reserved seats for indigenous peoples and the FARC
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The inverse of this number yields the effective number of candidates winning votes
at that polling place. If three candidates received the great majority of the votes
cast, but hundreds of candidates received just one or two votes, the competitive-
ness index would indicate that there were really only three candidates competing
at the polling place, which is less competitive than polling stations where the vote
share is more evenly shared across a larger number of candidates. I expect that
polling places surrounded by a greater number of communal action boards should
have higher voter mobilization among disparate candidates, and thus appear more
competitive as measured by the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
Second, I measure the percentage of votes at a polling place going to party leaders.
Party leaders in Colombia have higher name recognition than candidates featured
lower on the list, and are most likely to win a seat in Senate due to their po-
sition as the first party member on the party list. Votes only for the party go
toward their vote totals. Therefore, these candidates are the least likely to need
connections with individual voters through neighborhood brokers in comparison
with candidates farther down the party list. To calculate the percentages at each
polling place, I counted the number of votes cast for the leaders of the Green Al-
liance Party, Center Democratic Party, List of Decency Coalition, Radical Change
Party, Conservative Party of Colombia, Liberal Party of Colombia, MIRA Political
Party, Alternative Democratic Pole Party, and Social Party of National Unity (de
la U), divided by the total number of votes cast at that polling place. I expect
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that polling places with more dense broker networks will have lower vote shares for
party leaders relative to others on the ballot, reflecting roust mobilization efforts
by neighborhood brokers.
Because active communal boards are correlated with wealth, I control for the
economic strata of each polling place’s surrounding area using block-level data on
public service subsidy levels across the city (one being the most subsidized and
five being the least subsidized). To calculate the average economic strata level of
the areas surrounding each polling station, I weight the economic strata number
by the percentage of area covered and take the average. To control for the size of
the polling place, I include data on the total number of ballot boxes at the polling
place which proxies for polling station size while not being directly correlated with
the degree of voter mobilization.
4.6 Results
The distribution of communal action boards across polling stations is fairly evenly
split. About one-third of the polling places in Bogotá have no communal action
boards nearby. Another third only have one, and the final third have two or more
communal action boards. The polling place with the greatest number of communal
action boards has seven, while just over one hundred polling places have only two
CABs.
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Figure 4.2: Competition and Vote Share by Density of Communal Action Boards
Polling Place Competition
by Density Type
Party Leader Vote Share
by Density Type
Figure 4.3: Comparison between polling places with zero, one, and multiple CABs
in the vicinity
The results of the linear models are shown in Table 4.2. The Number of CABs in
the vicinity of the polling place is positively correlated with the effective number
of candidates winning votes at the polling place, and negatively associated with
party leader vote share at the polling place. Models 1 and 2 use values that have
been calculated after dropping annulled, blank, or not marked ballots. In other
words, this model calculates the effective number of candidates and the vote share
of party leaders using just valid votes. Dropping these votes from the vote totals
reduces the noise from voting that is likely not due to mobilization. Models 3 and 4
do the same but also drop votes cast for parties rather than individual candidates.
Dropping these voters captures just the effect of broker density on the valid votes
cast for individual candidates.11 In all of these models, one additional CAB in the
11Polling stations with high percentages of invalid or blank ballot and voting just for a party
rather than a candidate are positively correlated in the sample and correlated with a number of
alternative factors like wealth and interest in politics.
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vicinity of the polling station is related to an increase in the number of candidates
winning votes and lower vote shares for party leaders at that polling place.
While the overall effect size is small, the direction of the effect suggests that multi-
ple brokers in the vicinity of the polling place does not in fact reduce broker effort
in mobilizing voters. Voters choose to vote for a greater number of candidates in
these polling stations, and are more likely to choose down-list candidates rather
than party leaders. These two results taken together suggest that polling places
with larger numbers of communal action boards have more active voter mobiliza-
tion efforts across a broader array of candidates. These results are not likely due
to latent ideological effects since party-leaders represent front-runners across the
ideological spectrum, ranging from the Green Party to the rightist Center Demo-
cratic party.
Both dependent variables have immense variation among the polling places that
did not have any communal action boards in the vicinity, but are robust to exclud-
ing those polling places. Some polling places lack CABs because they are largely
wealthy and these wealthy polling station areas also have less blank and annulled
votes, as well as less party-line votes. Wealthy areas tend to have more votes
for the five most popular candidates nation-wide and an emphasis only on popular
candidates might lower the competitiveness of the polling place. Similarly, wealthy




Valid Votes Valid Votes for Candidates
Eff. # of Party Leader Eff. # of Party Leader
Candidates Vote Share Candidates Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of CABs 0.394∗∗ −0.456∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗ −0.472∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.134) (0.194) (0.162)
Wealth −7.462∗∗∗ 7.367∗∗∗ −7.718∗∗∗ 7.719∗∗∗
(Strata) (0.260) (0.188) (0.272) (0.226)
Number 0.027∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
of Tables (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012)
Constant 46.253∗∗∗ 8.222∗∗∗ 42.231∗∗∗ 15.531∗∗∗
(0.875) (0.631) (0.914) (0.762)
n 626 626 626 626
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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fect the results in the models where those types of ballots are included. Wealth
is negatively correlated with polling place competitiveness (measured through the
effective number of candidates) and positively correlated with party-leader vote
share, but the effect of CAB density is robust to the inclusion of controls for wealth.
Another potential explanation for the large variation among communities with no
nearby boards is that other more informal brokers are mobilizing voters at some
of these polling places. My current measurement strategy using communal action
board meeting rooms in some ways under-counts the number of active brokers. In
neighborhoods without formal boards, there still may be alternative forms of hier-
archical community organizing that are well-suited to brokerage arrangements in-
cluding apartment and condo associations, religious groups, parent organizations,
sports teams, and more. For example, some of the polling places with no nearby
communal action boards were very close to subsidized public housing projects,
which have community governance boards that are not listed as official communal
action boards. If multiple of these groups are organizing voters in the vicinity of
the polling place, we might expect similar results as if there were multiple com-
munal action boards organizing voters.
Both effects are robust to alternative specifications, including dropping certain
controls as well as dropping polling places that did not have any communal ac-
tion boards. Across all specifications, polling places with many communal action
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boards in the vicinity had more mobilization across candidates and lower vote
shares by party leaders, suggesting that brokers effort is not negatively affected by
broker density.
4.7 Conclusion
In addition to their work on advocacy and governance, local leaders often simul-
taneously perform the work of electoral brokers by buying and selling their neigh-
borhood’s votes. Brokers make vote-buying commitments to candidates for public
office in return for individual handouts like cash or collective public goods like the
promise of a paved road. Electoral geography - the distribution of communities
across polling places affects the level of accountability that local neighborhood
leaders face in their brokerage work because politicians can more easily attribute
vote tallies to some neighborhoods compared to others. Data featured in this pa-
per demonstrates large variation in the density of brokerage networks across the
city of Bogotá and it’s relation to voter mobilization efforts. I find that polling
places with denser brokerage networks have greater divergence in the number of
candidates receiving votes at the polling place, and that party leaders have lower
vote shares in polling places with more dense broker networks. Taken together,
these results support the theory that brokers in multiparty elections tend to work
for different candidates rather than mobilize for the same candidates, and are mo-
tivated to turn out voters for brokerage-dependent candidates. Results are robust
to multiple alternative specifications.
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The results of this paper raise a number of new questions on the role of geographically-
based brokers in political campaigns. First, polling station level results are likely
not the only way for brokers to signal effort, and more in-depth qualitative research
can shed light on alternative pathways for brokers and candidates to overcome the
information problem. Entrepreneurial brokers can use other tactics, including set-
ting up motorcycle brigades, checking in voters at multiple posts simultaneously
using google sheets, publicly committing to candidates by painting their names
on their house, and, for some neighborhood brokers, even unsuccessfully running
for office themselves one year to demonstrate how many votes they have influence
over. We should think more critically about whether candidates consider these
challenges to monitorability at the polling place level or just partner with trust-
worthy family or business partners.
A second avenue for future research concerns the ability for brokers to work to-
gether for the same candidate. Multiple brokers working for the same candidate
in one polling place exacerbates information and collective action problems both
between brokers and the candidates they work with. Candidates can’t attribute
effort to one broker or another, which increases the opportunity for brokers to min-
imize their own individual effort. Brokers working on the same team also may get
some reward whether they put in effort or not, furthering disincentives to mobilize
voters. However candidates for office often promise non-excludable club goods for
151
specific areas like wells, playgrounds, and paved roads. I also found in my field-
work some brokers who did seem to work together on electoral campaigns, despite
working at the same polling place as their team. More difficult to measure con-
cepts like kinship and networks of trust may play a key role in these collective acts.
Examining the role of broker density in two-party systems may also yield new in-
sights. In two-party systems, brokers should similarly be unlikely to work together
in support of the same candidates because monitoring problems are exacerbated
when only two candidates are on the ballot. In response, brokers with small voter
sizes may be excluded from campaigns because candidates can only reliably work
with one candidate per polling place. Future work could explore whether single-
member districts or other forms of majoritarian electoral systems could push out
smaller brokers in the same way that majoritarian systems tend to disfavor small
parties.
Finally, geographic brokerage networks in Colombia co-exist with organizational
networks like unions and religious groups. Whether membership in a brokerage
network is defined by long-standing identities like kinship (Cruz et al., 2017), or
more mutable identities like organization (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015) and
public employment connections (Oliveros, 2016), some forms of brokerage depend
are identifiable over geographic space and others are not. Previous research on
monitoring broker behavior has largely relied on brokers sending voters to a spe-
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cific polling place, but my research uncovered neighborhood communities with
voters who fanned out across the municipality to cast their ballot, usually with
transportation help from their neighborhood leader. Brokerage that lacks geo-
graphic boundaries accounts for much of the political mobilization in many parts
of the world, so understanding how those groups overcome monitoring problems
is an area ripe for future research.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion and Areas for Future Work
5.1 Summary
My dissertation explores the intersect of political and governance roles that grass-
roots leaders play in Colombian neighborhoods and how tensions between these
responsibilities affect connections with the state and politics at the barrio level. I
draw on extensive qualitative interviews and participant observation in combina-
tion with administrative data and survey data I collect in the field and to answer
questions related to effective grassroots governance. I explore the wealth of data I
have collected over the course of 16 months in the field and make a unique contri-
bution not only to the social science discipline but also to multidisciplinary studies
of urban life in Latin America.
5.2 Multidisciplinary Appeal
This work has wide multi-disciplinary appeal in the fields of development, and stud-
ies of the Latin American urban experience, while also employing cross-disciplinary
methods that speak to several different traditions of inquiry.
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Community-driven development programs are immensely popular in the aid com-
munity and increasingly pushed for by international donors, but these institutions
often suffer from forms of elite capture that prevents needed benefits from reaching
the intended clients. My dissertation directly speaks to this problem by carefully
documenting the multiple layers of responsibilities and incentives that grassroots
leaders face in order to account for potential tension between local leaders and orga-
nizational partners. This work will make an impact in several fields as grassroots
leaders are crucial partners in public health campaigns, micro-credit initiatives,
and transitional justice, among others.
Neighborhoods are a core part of people’s identity in Latin America, so aggregating
to voting precincts or localities smooths over important variation that drastically
impacts the quality of life in neighboring communities. Through field work and
labor-intensive data collection, my dissertation presents an analysis of the impact
grassroots leaders have on development, legitimacy, and democracy at the neigh-
borhood level and in doing so helps us better understand the human experience
in cities across Latin American and other parts of the globe.
Finally, this dissertation overcomes the challenges related to analysis at a sub-
municipal level by leveraging cross-disciplinary methods of inquiry ranging from
participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and quantitative experimental
methods. The centerpiece of my dissertation is a collection of interviews with
150 communal action board presidents and a typology to interpret the behavioral
constraints that they face. This research is one of only a handful of studies that
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collects data at this depth and scale through open-ended interviews with this type
of community actor.
5.3 Areas for Future Work
Communal action boards and other institutions like them present enormous op-
portunity for future research. Notably absent throughout the dissertation is a
systematic effort to document and explore the attitudes and opinions of local
residents rather than just leaders themselves. Each chapter in this dissertation
could generate new insights with research designs tailored towards capturing the
perceptions of neighborhood residents. In chapters one and two, interviews with
community members are essential in understanding the level of accountability that
leaders face, either through elections or collective social pressure. Similar sit-downs
with political campaigns may also yield new insights about how campaigns judge
the performance of certain neighborhoods and how much they rely on polling place
electoral results.
Intersectional identity dynamics undoubtedly play a role in how social leaders
filter community interests, but my dissertation lacks complete data on race, gen-
der, disability, youth, and sexual orientation. Given the role these identities play
in Colombia’s pandemic protest movement (el Paro) and the racial dynamics sur-
rounding the ongoing conflict, exploring these factors will result in a more complete
picture of how diverse groups use brokers to connect with the state and political
candidates.
156
While data from Colombia shows that the type of social leader varies within the
same formal institution and the same area of the country, future work should ex-
plore what kinds of institutional and contextual factors explain variation in type.
In interviews with communal action board leaders, respondents pointed to factors
like the ability to receive social-responsibility grants from private corporations
attempting to offset their environmental impact and the sheer distance between
rural communities and areas of political power as two important areas determining
their connection with political candidates. Other factors like the social capital of
the community, migration and displacement, the presence of competing sources of
community leadership, or long-term effects of violence may influence the ability






Introduction Script: Communal Action Board presidents like you are often ap-
proached by a number of candidates before an election asking for your endorse-
ment and help mobilizing voters in upcoming elections. We want to understand
how neighborhood social leaders like you decide which candidates to endorse, and
we’d like your help. We’ll show you pairs of people who could be running for state
assembly seats in Magdalena and some information about them. For each pair,
we’d like you to tell us which candidate you would endorse. You’ll see six different
pairs of candidates.
A.2 Pairwise Comparisons
Would you prefer to support a candidate that [Insert characteristic] or [Insert
characteristic]?
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Table A.1: Candidate Attributes
Attribute Values








The candidate has a lot of income? Yes, products of a business they
manage
No
Has the candidate made promises about ben-
efits for this neighborhood?
Has promised to finance a pro-
gram of your choice
None
Has the candidate made any promises about
individual benefits for the president of the
CAB?
Yes, will provide particular bene-
fits
No
Is there an investigation open against the
candidate on questions of political integrity?
None
An investigation was closed due
to lack of evidence
There is an open investigation
Table A.2: Pairwise Comparisons
Characteristics
1) Had a good likelihood of winning
2) Had a reputation for not being corrupt
3) Promised particular benefits to supporters
4) Promised to finance a project in your neighborhood
A.3 Interview Questions:
These questions were substantially shortened to increase response rates in the new
over-the-phone format.
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Table A.3: Section I: Personal Characteristics
Charge [President, Vice president]
Neighborhood Size Approximately how many people live in this neighbor-
hood?
Membership Size Approximately how many people are members of the
CAB?
Table A.4: Section II: Neighborhood Type




Does your neighborhood lack the following services?
Water, Individually-metered electricity, Sewage, Paved
Roads
Table A.5: Section III: Election Questions
Are you running for
re-election?
[Yes, No, Not sure]
Is anyone running
against you?
[Yes, No, Not sure]
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Table A.6: Section IV: Open Answer Questions
History of leadership How did you come to be a neighborhood leader?
Requests Do the people in your neighborhood ask you for help with
things? What kind of requests do you receive from the
residents of the neighborhood? Can you usually help
them or are the requests not reasonable?
Mobilization During the national and territorial elections, do you help
voters in your neighborhood get to the polls? How many
people can you usually mobilize? In your experience, are
there benefits to working with political candidates?
Government Opinion Do you think the people in the city government value
your opinions and knowledge about things that happen
in your neighborhood?
Re-election What do you think matters for getting re-elected as a
CAB leader?
COVID 19 Is there a role for social leaders like you in controlling
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